Dunn v. Blumstein (1972) - Revision history

Admin: Admin moved page Dunn v. Blumstein to Dunn v. Blumstein (1972)

2019-10-18T09:07:55Z

Admin moved page Dunn v. Blumstein to Dunn v. Blumstein (1972)

Admin at 06:06, 17 August 2018

2018-08-17T06:06:44Z

Admin at 02:40, 4 July 2018

2018-07-04T02:40:23Z

Morgannoel18 at 08:28, 22 October 2017

2017-10-22T08:28:58Z

Admin at 15:43, 28 September 2017

2017-09-28T15:43:56Z

Nicole: Created page with "In ''Dunn v. Blumstein'' (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Tennessee’s durational residency requirement to vote. The law required a one-year residency in the state..."

2017-01-24T18:35:13Z

Created page with "In ''Dunn v. Blumstein'' (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Tennessee’s durational residency requirement to vote. The law required a one-year residency in the state..."

New page

In ''Dunn v. Blumstein'' (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Tennessee’s durational residency requirement to vote. The law required a one-year residency in the state and a thirty-day residency in the county in order to vote. The state had argued that the durational requirement prevented fraud and made the voters knowledgeable, but the Court said that a substantial period of residency failed the strict scrutiny test: there was not an overriding reason to curtail a right as fundamental as voting. The Court pointed out that Congress in the 1970 Voting Rights Act set thirty days of residency in a state to make a person eligible to vote in a presidential election, and that was an ample period for a state to complete whatever administrative tasks that are necessary to prevent fraud. An appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be necessary for a political community, but the durational requirement in this case abridged not only the right to vote, but also the right to travel, which is protected against state infringement by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

==== Robert W. Langran ====

SEE ALSO: [[Edwards v. California]]; [[Privileges and Immunities Clause: Fourteenth Amendment]]

← Older revision		Revision as of 06:06, 17 August 2018
Line 1:		Line 1:
−	In ''Dunn v. Blumstein'' (1972), the [[Supreme Court of the United States\|U.S. Supreme Court]] struck down Tennessee’s durational residency requirement to vote. The law required a one-year residency in the state and a thirty-day residency in the county in order to vote. The state had argued that the durational requirement prevented fraud and made the voters knowledgeable, but the Court said that a substantial period of residency failed the strict scrutiny test: there was not an overriding reason to curtail a right as fundamental as voting. The Court pointed out that Congress in the 1970 Voting Rights Act set thirty days of residency in a state to make a person eligible to vote in a presidential election, and that was an ample period for a state to complete whatever administrative tasks that are necessary to prevent fraud. An appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be necessary for a political community, but the durational requirement in this case abridged not only the right to vote, but also the right to travel, which is protected against state infringement by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the [[Fourteenth Amendment]].	+	In ''Dunn v. Blumstein'' (1972), the [[Supreme Court of the United States\|U.S. Supreme Court]] struck down Tennessee’s durational residency requirement to vote. The law required a one-year residency in the state and a thirty-day residency in the county in order to vote. The state had argued that the durational requirement prevented fraud and made the voters knowledgeable, but the Court said that a substantial period of residency failed the strict scrutiny test: there was not an overriding reason to curtail a right as fundamental as voting. The Court pointed out that [[U.S. Congress\|Congress]] in the 1970 [[Voting Rights Act of 1965\|Voting Rights Act]] set thirty days of residency in a state to make a person eligible to vote in a presidential election, and that was an ample period for a state to complete whatever administrative tasks that are necessary to prevent fraud. An appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be necessary for a political community, but the durational requirement in this case abridged not only the right to vote, but also the right to travel, which is protected against state infringement by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the [[Fourteenth Amendment]].

	==== Robert W. Langran ====		==== Robert W. Langran ====

← Older revision		Revision as of 02:40, 4 July 2018
Line 1:		Line 1:
−	In ''Dunn v. Blumstein'' (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Tennessee’s durational residency requirement to vote. The law required a one-year residency in the state and a thirty-day residency in the county in order to vote. The state had argued that the durational requirement prevented fraud and made the voters knowledgeable, but the Court said that a substantial period of residency failed the strict scrutiny test: there was not an overriding reason to curtail a right as fundamental as voting. The Court pointed out that Congress in the 1970 Voting Rights Act set thirty days of residency in a state to make a person eligible to vote in a presidential election, and that was an ample period for a state to complete whatever administrative tasks that are necessary to prevent fraud. An appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be necessary for a political community, but the durational requirement in this case abridged not only the right to vote, but also the right to travel, which is protected against state infringement by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.	+	In ''Dunn v. Blumstein'' (1972), the [[Supreme Court of the United States\|U.S. Supreme Court]] struck down Tennessee’s durational residency requirement to vote. The law required a one-year residency in the state and a thirty-day residency in the county in order to vote. The state had argued that the durational requirement prevented fraud and made the voters knowledgeable, but the Court said that a substantial period of residency failed the strict scrutiny test: there was not an overriding reason to curtail a right as fundamental as voting. The Court pointed out that Congress in the 1970 Voting Rights Act set thirty days of residency in a state to make a person eligible to vote in a presidential election, and that was an ample period for a state to complete whatever administrative tasks that are necessary to prevent fraud. An appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be necessary for a political community, but the durational requirement in this case abridged not only the right to vote, but also the right to travel, which is protected against state infringement by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the [[Fourteenth Amendment]].

	==== Robert W. Langran ====		==== Robert W. Langran ====

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:43, 28 September 2017
Line 4:		Line 4:

	SEE ALSO: [[Edwards v. California]]; [[Privileges and Immunities Clause: Fourteenth Amendment]]		SEE ALSO: [[Edwards v. California]]; [[Privileges and Immunities Clause: Fourteenth Amendment]]
		+
		+	[[Category:Supreme Court Cases]]

← Older revision	Revision as of 09:07, 18 October 2019
(No difference)

@@ Line 2: / Line 2: @@
 ==== Robert W. Langran ====
 SEE ALSO: [[Edwards v. California]]; [[Privileges and Immunities Clause: Fourteenth Amendment]]
 [[Category:Supreme Court Cases]]