United States v. Lopez (1995) - Revision history

Admin: Admin moved page United States v. Lopez to United States v. Lopez (1995)

2019-10-21T21:06:55Z

Admin moved page United States v. Lopez to United States v. Lopez (1995)

Admin at 01:44, 14 June 2019

2019-06-14T01:44:26Z

Morgannoel18 at 08:25, 28 October 2017

2017-10-28T08:25:31Z

Admin at 20:18, 28 September 2017

2017-09-28T20:18:20Z

Nicole: Created page with "In ''United States v. Lopez'' (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal “Gun-Free School Zones Act” was unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the statute was n..."

2017-02-06T18:02:16Z

Created page with "In ''United States v. Lopez'' (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal “Gun-Free School Zones Act” was unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the statute was n..."

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In ''United States v. Lopez'' (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal “Gun-Free School Zones Act” was unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the statute was not within Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution. The case is significant because it marked the first time since the New Deal, sixty years earlier, that the Court has struck down a federal statute for exceeding Congress’s commerce power.

The origins of the case can be traced to March 10, 1992, when school officials at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, caught twelfth grader Alfonso Lopez Jr. with an unloaded .38 caliber handgun and five bullets. Lopez claimed that he was being paid to transport the gun to someone else. He was initially charged with violating a state law making it illegal to bring guns to school, but federal prosecutors later asserted jurisdiction and charged Lopez with violating the recently enacted federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. That statute made it a federal crime to possess a gun in “school zones,” defined as all areas within “1000 feet from the grounds of . . . a school,” and including the school grounds themselves. Lopez was convicted in a federal trial court, but eventually appealed his conviction all the way to the Supreme Court.

Writing for the majority in a closely divided 5–4 decision, Chief Justice William Rehnquist acknowledged that since the New Deal in the 1930s, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress’s commerce power very broadly, consistently holding that Congress has broad powers to regulate even local activities that have “substantial effects” on interstate commerce. However, Rehnquist stated that the Court would have to pile “inference upon inference” in order to conclude that the mere ''possession'' of guns (or anything else for that matter) in or near ''local'' schools could be characterized as ''interstate commerce''. Thus, the Court determined that the possession of guns in local schools could not be considered within one of Congress’s Article I enumerated powers, and therefore it must be left to states and localities to regulate. Joining Rehnquist in the majority were Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas. The dissenters in the case, Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, claimed that the Court was unduly and improperly attempting to draw judicially imposed lines around federal legislative powers.

Although ''Lopez'' is noteworthy for being the first case in six decades in which the Supreme Court found limits to Congress’s commerce power, it is also important for effectively marking the beginning of what some have dubbed the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution,” consisting of a series of federalism decisions handed down by the Rehnquist Court throughout the remainder of the 1990s. In addition to reestablishing limits to federal power under the Commerce Clause, the Court, usually with the same 5–4 split as in the ''Lopez'' case, has since sought to limit congressional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (e.g., ''City of Boerne v. Flores'' 1995 and ''United States v. Morrison'' 2000), enhance state immunity from civil suits under the Eleventh Amendment (e.g., ''Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida'' 1996 and ''Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents'' 2000), and prohibit federal laws that intrude on the states’ sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment (e.g., ''New York v. United States'' 1992 and ''Printz v. United States'' 1997). These and other cases have sparked contentious debates within the Court and among commentators over the Court’s proper role in defining the scope of federal powers.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
| '''BIBLIOGRAPHY:'''
Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers: In Defense of ''United States v. Lopez'',” ''Michigan Law Review'' 94 (1995): 752–831; ''City of Boerne v. Flores'', 521 U.S. 507 (1995); Ruth Colker and James Brudney, “Dissing Congress,” ''University of Michigan Law Review'' 100 (2001): 80–144; ''Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents'', 528 U.S. 62 (2000); ''New York v. United States'', 505 U.S. 144 (1992); J. Mitchell Pickerill, ''Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in a Separated System'' (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); J. Mitchell Pickerill and Cornell W. Clayton, “The Rehnquist Court and the Political Dynamics of Federalism,” ''Perspectives on Politics'' 2 (June 2004): 233–48; ''Printz v. United States'', 521 U.S. 898 (1997); ''Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida'', 517 U.S. 44 (1996); ''United States v. Lopez'', 514 U.S. 549 (1995); and ''United States v. Morrison'', 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
|}

==== J. Mitchell Pickerill ====

SEE ALSO: [[NewYork v. United States]]; [[Printz v. United States]]; [[Tenth Amendment]]

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	SEE ALSO: [[NewYork v. United States]]; [[Printz v. United States]]; [[Tenth Amendment]]		SEE ALSO: [[NewYork v. United States]]; [[Printz v. United States]]; [[Tenth Amendment]]
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		+	[[Category:Supreme Court Cases]]

← Older revision	Revision as of 21:06, 21 October 2019
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-In ''United States v. Lopez'' (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal “Gun-Free School Zones Act” was unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the statute was not within Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution. The case is significant because it marked the first time since the New Deal, sixty years earlier, that the Court has struck down a federal statute for exceeding Congress’s commerce power.
+In ''United States v. Lopez'' (1995), the [[Supreme Court of the United States|U.S. Supreme Court]] held that the federal “Gun-Free School Zones Act” was unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the statute was not within [[U.S. Congress|Congress’s]] power to regulate [[Interstate Commerce|interstate commerce]] under Article I, Section 8, of the [[U.S. Constitution|Constitution]]. The case is significant because it marked the first time since the [[New Deal]], sixty years earlier, that the Court has struck down a federal statute for exceeding Congress’s commerce power.
 The origins of the case can be traced to March 10, 1992, when school officials at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, caught twelfth grader Alfonso Lopez Jr. with an unloaded .38 caliber handgun and five bullets. Lopez claimed that he was being paid to transport the gun to someone else. He was initially charged with violating a state law making it illegal to bring guns to school, but federal prosecutors later asserted jurisdiction and charged Lopez with violating the recently enacted federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. That statute made it a federal crime to possess a gun in “school zones,” defined as all areas within “1000 feet from the grounds of . . . a school,” and including the school grounds themselves. Lopez was convicted in a federal trial court, but eventually appealed his conviction all the way to the Supreme Court.
-Writing for the majority in a closely divided 5–4 decision, Chief Justice William Rehnquist acknowledged that since the New Deal in the 1930s, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress’s commerce power very broadly, consistently holding that Congress has broad powers to regulate even local activities that have “substantial effects” on interstate commerce. However, Rehnquist stated that the Court would have to pile “inference upon inference” in order to conclude that the mere ''possession'' of guns (or anything else for that matter) in or near ''local'' schools could be characterized as ''interstate commerce''. Thus, the Court determined that the possession of guns in local schools could not be considered within one of Congress’s Article I enumerated powers, and therefore it must be left to states and localities to regulate. Joining Rehnquist in the majority were Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas. The dissenters in the case, Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, claimed that the Court was unduly and improperly attempting to draw judicially imposed lines around federal legislative powers.
+Writing for the majority in a closely divided 5–4 decision, Chief Justice [[Rehnquist, William|William Rehnquist]] acknowledged that since the New Deal in the 1930's, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress’s commerce power very broadly, consistently holding that Congress has broad powers to regulate even local activities that have “substantial effects” on interstate commerce. However, Rehnquist stated that the Court would have to pile “inference upon inference” in order to conclude that the mere ''possession'' of guns (or anything else for that matter) in or near ''local'' schools could be characterized as ''interstate commerce''. Thus, the Court determined that the possession of guns in local schools could not be considered within one of Congress’s Article I enumerated powers, and therefore it must be left to states and localities to regulate. Joining Rehnquist in the majority were Justices [[O’Connor, Sandra Day|Sandra Day O’Connor]], [[Scalia, Antonin|Antonin Scalia]], Anthony Kennedy, and [[Thomas, Clarence|Clarence Thomas]]. The dissenters in the case, Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, claimed that the Court was unduly and improperly attempting to draw judicially imposed lines around federal legislative powers.
-Although ''Lopez'' is noteworthy for being the first case in six decades in which the Supreme Court found limits to Congress’s commerce power, it is also important for effectively marking the beginning of what some have dubbed the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution,” consisting of a series of federalism decisions handed down by the Rehnquist Court throughout the remainder of the 1990s. In addition to reestablishing limits to federal power under the Commerce Clause, the Court, usually with the same 5–4 split as in the ''Lopez'' case, has since sought to limit congressional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (e.g., ''City of Boerne v. Flores'' 1995 and ''United States v. Morrison'' 2000), enhance state immunity from civil suits under the Eleventh Amendment (e.g., ''Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida'' 1996 and ''Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents'' 2000), and prohibit federal laws that intrude on the states’ sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment (e.g., ''New York v. United States'' 1992 and ''Printz v. United States'' 1997). These and other cases have sparked contentious debates within the Court and among commentators over the Court’s proper role in defining the scope of federal powers.
+Although ''Lopez'' is noteworthy for being the first case in six decades in which the Supreme Court found limits to Congress’s commerce power, it is also important for effectively marking the beginning of what some have dubbed the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution,” consisting of a series of [[federalism]] decisions handed down by the Rehnquist Court throughout the remainder of the 1990's. In addition to reestablishing limits to federal power under the Commerce Clause, the Court, usually with the same 5–4 split as in the ''Lopez'' case, has since sought to limit congressional authority under Section 5 of the [[Fourteenth Amendment]] (e.g., ''[[City of Boerne v. Flores]]'' 1995 and ''[[United States v. Morrison]]'' 2000), enhance state immunity from civil suits under the [[Eleventh Amendment]] (e.g., ''[[Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida]]'' 1996 and ''Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents'' 2000), and prohibit federal laws that intrude on the states’ [[sovereignty]] under the [[Tenth Amendment]] (e.g., ''[[New York v. United States]]'' 1992 and ''Printz v. United States'' 1997). These and other cases have sparked contentious debates within the Court and among commentators over the Court’s proper role in defining the scope of federal powers.
 {| class="wikitable"

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 ==== J. Mitchell Pickerill ====
 SEE ALSO: [[NewYork v. United States]]; [[Printz v. United States]]; [[Tenth Amendment]]
 [[Category:Supreme Court Cases]]