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Federalism and its kindred terms (e.g., “federal”) are used, most broadly,
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Federalism and its kindred terms (e.g., “federal”) are used, most broadly, to describe the mode of political organization that unites separate polities into an overarching political system so as to allow each to maintain its fundamental political integrity. Federal systems do this by distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of all the governments. By requiring that basic policies be made and implemented through negotiation in some form, it enables all to share the system’s decision making and decision-making processes.
to describe the mode of political organization that unites separate polities into an overarching
 
political system so as to allow each to maintain its fundamental political integrity.
 
Federal systems do this by distributing power among general and constituent
 
governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of all the governments.
 
By requiring that basic policies be made and implemented through negotiation
 
in some form, it enables all to share the system’s decision making and
 
decision-making processes.
 
  
 
=== DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS ===
 
=== DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS ===
No single definition of federalism has proved satisfactory to all students, primarily because
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No single definition of federalism has proved satisfactory to all students, primarily because of the difficulties in relating theoretical formulations to the evidence gathered from observing the actual operation of federal systems. Attempts at definition have also foundered on the problems of distinguishing between (1) the federal principle as a broad social concept and federalism as a narrower political device, (2) two classic but different conceptions of federalism, (3) authentically federal systems and political systems that utilize elements of the federal principle, (4) mature and emergent federal systems, and (5) federalism and “intergovernmental relations” as distinct political phenomena.
of the difficulties in relating theoretical formulations to the evidence gathered
 
from observing the actual operation of federal systems. Attempts at definition have also
 
foundered on the problems of distinguishing between (1) the federal principle as a
 
broad social concept and federalism as a narrower political device, (2) two classic but
 
different conceptions of federalism, (3) authentically federal systems and political systems
 
that utilize elements of the federal principle, (4) mature and emergent federal systems,
 
and (5) federalism and “intergovernmental relations” as distinct political
 
phenomena.
 
  
 
==== Social and Political Principle ====
 
==== Social and Political Principle ====
Federalism, conceived in the broadest social sense, looks to the linkage of people and
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Federalism, conceived in the broadest social sense, looks to the linkage of people and institutions by mutual consent, without the sacrifice of their individual identities, as the ideal form of social organization. First formulated in the covenant theories of the Bible (Kaufman 1937–48), this conception of federalism was revived by the Bible-centered “federal” theologians of seventeenth-century Britain and New England (Miller [1939] 1961), who coined the term “federal”—derived from the Latin ''foedus'' (covenant)—in 1645 to describe the system of holy and enduring covenants between God and man that lay the foundation of their worldview. This conception of federalism was given new theoretical form by nineteenth-century French and German social theorists. Closely related to the various theories of social contract, it is characterized by the desire to build society on the basis of coordinative rather than subordinative relationships and by the emphasis on partnership among parties with equal claims to legitimacy who seek to cultivate their diverse integrities within a common social order (Boehm 1931).
institutions by mutual consent, without the sacrifice of their individual identities, as the
 
ideal form of social organization. First formulated in the covenant theories of the Bible
 
(Kaufman 1937–48), this conception of federalism was revived by the Bible-centered
 
“federal” theologians of seventeenth-century Britain and New England (Miller [1939]
 
1961), who coined the term “federal”—derived from the Latin foedus (covenant)—in
 
1645 to describe the system of holy and enduring covenants between God and man that
 
lay the foundation of their worldview. This conception of federalism was given new
 
theoretical form by nineteenth-century French and German social theorists. Closely related
 
to the various theories of social contract, it is characterized by the desire to build
 
society on the basis of coordinative rather than subordinative relationships and by the
 
emphasis on partnership among parties with equal claims to legitimacy who seek to
 
cultivate their diverse integrities within a common social order (Boehm 1931).
 
  
As a political device, federalism can be viewed more narrowly as a kind of political
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As a political device, federalism can be viewed more narrowly as a kind of political order animated by political principles that emphasize the primacy of bargaining and negotiated coordination among several power centers as a prelude to the exercise of power within a single political system, and that stress the value of dispersed power centers as a means for safeguarding individual and local liberties. This means, in effect, that political institutions common to different political systems, when combined within a federal system and animated by federal principles, are effectively endowed with a distinctive character. For example, while political parties are common in modern political systems, parties animated by the federal principle show unique characteristics of fragmentation and a lack of central discipline that increase the power of local groups within the system as a whole (Grodzins 1960a).
order animated by political principles that emphasize the primacy of bargaining and
 
negotiated coordination among several power centers as a prelude to the exercise of
 
power within a single political system, and that stress the value of dispersed power centers
 
as a means for safeguarding individual and local liberties. This means, in effect,
 
that political institutions common to different political systems, when combined within
 
a federal system and animated by federal principles, are effectively endowed with a
 
distinctive character. For example, while political parties are common in modern political
 
systems, parties animated by the federal principle show unique characteristics of
 
fragmentation and a lack of central discipline that increase the power of local groups
 
within the system as a whole (Grodzins 1960a).
 
  
 
==== Federation and Confederation ====
 
==== Federation and Confederation ====
Federal ideas have been systematically conceptualized in two different ways. On the
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Federal ideas have been systematically conceptualized in two different ways. On the one hand, federalism has been conceived as a means to unite a people already linked by bonds of nationality through the distribution of political power among the nation’s constituent units. In such cases, the polities that constitute the federal system are unalterably parts of the national whole, and federalism invariably leads to the development of a strong national government operating in direct contact with the people it serves, just as the constituent governments do. On the other hand, federalism has also been conceived as a means to unify diverse peoples for important but limited purposes, without disrupting their primary ties to the individual polities that constitute the federal system. In such cases the federal government is generally limited in its scope and powers, functioning through constituent governments that retain their plenary autonomy, and to a substantial degree is dependent upon them.
one hand, federalism has been conceived as a means to unite a people already linked
 
by bonds of nationality through the distribution of political power among the nation’s
 
constituent units. In such cases, the polities that constitute the federal system are unalterably
 
parts of the national whole, and federalism invariably leads to the development
 
of a strong national government operating in direct contact with the people it
 
serves, just as the constituent governments do. On the other hand, federalism has also
 
been conceived as a means to unify diverse peoples for important but limited purposes,
 
without disrupting their primary ties to the individual polities that constitute the federal
 
system. In such cases the federal government is generally limited in its scope and
 
powers, functioning through constituent governments that retain their plenary autonomy,
 
and to a substantial degree is dependent upon them.
 
  
Both conceptions of federalism have evolved from early federal experiments. The
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Both conceptions of federalism have evolved from early federal experiments. The principles of strong national federalism were first applied by the ancient Israelites, beginning in the thirteenth century B.C., to maintain their national unity through linking their several tribes under a single national constitution and at least quasi-federal political institutions (Bright 1959). Several centuries later, the Greek city-states experimented with federal-style institutions as means for the promotion of intranational harmony and cooperation, primarily for defensive purposes, through associations (e.g., the Achaean League) that came close to what were later defined as confederations (Freeman [1863] 1893). A modified form of the Greek view was developed by the sixteenth-century theorists (Gierke [1913] 1934). They held that federalism meant a permanent league of states united through a perpetual covenant, binding under international law, in which the constituent states delegated enumerated powers to a general government while retaining full rights of internal sovereignty.
principles of strong national federalism were first applied by the ancient Israelites, beginning
 
in the thirteenth century B.C., to maintain their national unity through linking
 
their several tribes under a single national constitution and at least quasi-federal political
 
institutions (Bright 1959). Several centuries later, the Greek city-states experimented
 
with federal-style institutions as means for the promotion of intranational
 
harmony and cooperation, primarily for defensive purposes, through associations (e.g.,
 
the Achaean League) that came close to what were later defined as confederations
 
(Freeman [1863] 1893). A modified form of the Greek view was developed by the
 
sixteenth-century theorists (Gierke [1913] 1934). They held that federalism meant a
 
permanent league of states united through a perpetual covenant, binding under international
 
law, in which the constituent states delegated enumerated powers to a general
 
government while retaining full rights of internal sovereignty.
 
  
However, when the American system—the prototype of modern federal systems—
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However, when the American system—the prototype of modern federal systems—emerged in the late eighteenth century, its architects developed a conception of federalism much like that of ancient Israel. From the first, American federalism functioned to serve a people with a single national identity and was constituted with a strong national government to serve that people on a national basis, though, as late as 1789, ''[[The Federalist Papers|The Federalist]]'' could describe the new American [[U.S. Constitution|Constitution]] as “partly national and partly federal” in deference to the then-accepted views. The successful efforts of the supporters of the Constitution to appropriate the term “federalist” for their own use (Main 1961, ix–xi) restored to common usage the older conception of federalism as a noncentralized national union bound by municipal law, with a general government superior to the governments of the constituent states (Diamond 1963).
emerged in the late eighteenth century, its architects developed a conception of federalism
 
much like that of ancient Israel. From the first, American federalism functioned
 
to serve a people with a single national identity and was constituted with a strong national
 
government to serve that people on a national basis, though, as late as 1789, The
 
Federalist could describe the new American Constitution as “partly national and partly
 
federal” in deference to the then-accepted views. The successful efforts of the supporters
 
of the Constitution to appropriate the term “federalist” for their own use (Main
 
1961, ix–xi) restored to common usage the older conception of federalism as a noncentralized
 
national union bound by municipal law, with a general government superior
 
to the governments of the constituent states (Diamond 1963).
 
  
Just as the American system became the prototype for other modern federal systems,
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Just as the American system became the prototype for other modern federal systems, so the American conception of federalism became the generally accepted one. The other conception was ultimately subsumed under the word “confederation” and its kindred terms. The two systems described by these different conceptions reflect, in part, the distinctions implied in the German ''Staatenbund'' (confederation) and ''Bundesstaat'' (federation), terms developed in the mid-nineteenth century (Mogi 1931). A certain degree of confusion remains because the terms invented to describe both systems were used indiscriminately for many years.
so the American conception of federalism became the generally accepted one. The other
 
conception was ultimately subsumed under the word “confederation” and its kindred
 
terms. The two systems described by these different conceptions reflect, in part, the
 
distinctions implied in the German Staatenbund (confederation) and Bundesstaat (federation),
 
terms developed in the mid-nineteenth century (Mogi 1931). A certain degree
 
of confusion remains because the terms invented to describe both systems were used
 
indiscriminately for many years.
 
  
Though the American conception of federalism is today almost universally accepted
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Though the American conception of federalism is today almost universally accepted as the most accurate usage, the confederal conception remains a living and legitimate aspect of the federal idea in its largest political sense. Today, the latter is most prominent among certain advocates of limited European union (the Common Market exemplifies a confederal form) and among many so-called world [[federalists]].
as the most accurate usage, the confederal conception remains a living and legitimate
 
aspect of the federal idea in its largest political sense. Today, the latter is most prominent
 
among certain advocates of limited European union (the Common Market exemplifies
 
a confederal form) and among many so-called world federalists.
 
  
 
==== Federalism and Related Systems ====
 
==== Federalism and Related Systems ====
Federal systems are often confused with four other forms of political order that make
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Federal systems are often confused with four other forms of political order that make use of specific federal principles. The use of some federal principles in multiple monarchies, legislative unions, empires, and decentralized unitary systems can have important consequences similar to those in authentically federal systems. But the fact that such principles do not permeate the four systems makes the distinctions between them and true federations extremely important. Federal systems differ from multiple (or dual) monarchies in two essential ways. The central constitutional characteristic of the multiple monarchy is that union exists only in the person of the sovereign and is maintained only through the exercise of executive power in the sovereign’s name. No significant common institutions exist to unite the constituent polities—no common legislatures, no common legal system, and little in the way of a common political substructure. On the contrary, each constituent polity maintains its own political system, which the monarch guarantees to support under the terms of his or her compact with the realm. Multiple monarchies have historically been less than democratic regimes. Even where there have been tendencies toward democratization, the very fact that union exists only by virtue of the common sovereign has tended to elevate the position of the monarch to one of real power. Attempts to transfer sovereignty or the attributes of sovereignty elsewhere, by their very nature, stimulate the division of this kind of association of civil societies into separate polities. Thus, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was held together by the Hapsburg emperors and disintegrated when that family ceased to rule (Sharma 1953, ch. 7). The dual monarchy of Sweden and Norway ceased to function when democratic government was introduced, transferring the attributes of sovereignty from the monarch to the nation(s). In Spain, on the other hand, the inability of the Spaniards to transform a multiple monarchy into a federal system, in a locale that by nature demanded peninsular union of some sort, led to the consolidation of the constituent polities into something approximating a unitary state that remained highly unstable because of the local barriers to consolidation that could be neither accommodated nor eradicated (Elliott 1964).
use of specific federal principles. The use of some federal principles in multiple monarchies,
 
legislative unions, empires, and decentralized unitary systems can have important
 
consequences similar to those in authentically federal systems. But the fact that
 
such principles do not permeate the four systems makes the distinctions between them
 
and true federations extremely important. Federal systems differ from multiple (or dual)
 
monarchies in two essential ways. The central constitutional characteristic of the multiple
 
monarchy is that union exists only in the person of the sovereign and is maintained
 
only through the exercise of executive power in the sovereign’s name. No
 
significant common institutions exist to unite the constituent polities—no common legislatures,
 
no common legal system, and little in the way of a common political substructure.
 
On the contrary, each constituent polity maintains its own political system,
 
which the monarch guarantees to support under the terms of his or her compact with
 
the realm. Multiple monarchies have historically been less than democratic regimes.
 
Even where there have been tendencies toward democratization, the very fact that union
 
exists only by virtue of the common sovereign has tended to elevate the position of the
 
monarch to one of real power. Attempts to transfer sovereignty or the attributes of sovereignty elsewhere, by their very nature, stimulate the division of this kind of association
 
of civil societies into separate polities. Thus, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was
 
held together by the Hapsburg emperors and disintegrated when that family ceased to
 
rule (Sharma 1953, ch. 7). The dual monarchy of Sweden and Norway ceased to function
 
when democratic government was introduced, transferring the attributes of sovereignty
 
from the monarch to the nation(s). In Spain, on the other hand, the inability of
 
the Spaniards to transform a multiple monarchy into a federal system, in a locale that
 
by nature demanded peninsular union of some sort, led to the consolidation of the constituent
 
polities into something approximating a unitary state that remained highly unstable
 
because of the local barriers to consolidation that could be neither accommodated
 
nor eradicated (Elliott 1964).
 
  
Multiple monarchies have been transformed into stable and unified polities through
+
Multiple monarchies have been transformed into stable and unified polities through legislative union. The United Kingdom is a case in point. The centrifugal tendencies of the seventeenth-century dual monarchy linking England and Scotland were finally eliminated through a legislative union of the two nations in 1707. Legislative union bears very close resemblance to federal union at several crucial points. Though designed to direct public allegiance to a single national authority, the terms of the union encourage the political system to retain certain noncentralizing elements. The government of the nation remains national rather than central in character, since it is created by a perpetual covenant that guarantees the constituent parties their boundaries, representation in the national legislature, and certain local autonomies, such as their own systems of municipal law. Legislative unions usually unite unequal polities. The centralizing tendencies induced by this are somewhat counterbalanced by the residual desire for local self-government in the constituent states. Thus, in the United Kingdom the cabinet has acquired a supremacy not foreseen in 1707, but within the framework of cabinet government Scotland has acquired a national ministry of its own with a separate administrative structure, based in Scotland, for most of its governmental programs (Milne 1957).
legislative union. The United Kingdom is a case in point. The centrifugal tendencies
 
of the seventeenth-century dual monarchy linking England and Scotland were finally
 
eliminated through a legislative union of the two nations in 1707. Legislative union
 
bears very close resemblance to federal union at several crucial points. Though designed
 
to direct public allegiance to a single national authority, the terms of the union
 
encourage the political system to retain certain noncentralizing elements. The government
 
of the nation remains national rather than central in character, since it is created
 
by a perpetual covenant that guarantees the constituent parties their boundaries, representation
 
in the national legislature, and certain local autonomies, such as their own
 
systems of municipal law. Legislative unions usually unite unequal polities. The centralizing
 
tendencies induced by this are somewhat counterbalanced by the residual desire
 
for local self-government in the constituent states. Thus, in the United Kingdom
 
the cabinet has acquired a supremacy not foreseen in 1707, but within the framework
 
of cabinet government Scotland has acquired a national ministry of its own with a separate
 
administrative structure, based in Scotland, for most of its governmental programs
 
(Milne 1957).
 
  
Federal systems also differ from empires allowing cultural home rule. Such empires
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Federal systems also differ from empires allowing cultural home rule. Such empires have often been termed “federal”—in some cases because they claim to be. The Roman Empire was the classic example of this kind of political system in the ancient world, and the Soviet Union may well have been its classic modern counterpart. In both cases, highly centralized political authorities possessing a virtual monopoly of power decide, for reasons of policy, to allow local populations with different ethnic or cultural backgrounds to maintain a degree of cultural home rule, provided that they remain politically subservient to the imperial regime. While this often appears to offer a substantial degree of local autonomy, its political effects are purposely kept minimal. Any local efforts to transform cultural home rule into political power are invariably met with suppressive force from the central government, even to the point of revoking cultural rights, as examples from the history of both empires reveal.
have often been termed “federal”—in some cases because they claim to be. The Roman
 
Empire was the classic example of this kind of political system in the ancient world,
 
and the Soviet Union may well have been its classic modern counterpart. In both cases,
 
highly centralized political authorities possessing a virtual monopoly of power decide,
 
for reasons of policy, to allow local populations with different ethnic or cultural backgrounds
 
to maintain a degree of cultural home rule, provided that they remain politically
 
subservient to the imperial regime. While this often appears to offer a substantial
 
degree of local autonomy, its political effects are purposely kept minimal. Any local
 
efforts to transform cultural home rule into political power are invariably met with suppressive
 
force from the central government, even to the point of revoking cultural rights,
 
as examples from the history of both empires reveal.
 
  
Federal systems are clearly different from decentralized unitary states, even though
+
Federal systems are clearly different from decentralized unitary states, even though such states may allow local governments considerable autonomy in some ways. In such states, local powers are invariably restricted to local matters, as determined by the central authorities, and are subject to national supervision, restriction, and even withdrawal, though tradition may mitigate against precipitous action by the central government in areas where local privileges have been established. Still, as the English experience has shown, even powerful traditions supporting local autonomy have not stood in the way of great reconcentration of power by democratically elected parliaments when such action has been deemed necessary by a national majority.
such states may allow local governments considerable autonomy in some ways. In such
 
states, local powers are invariably restricted to local matters, as determined by the central
 
authorities, and are subject to national supervision, restriction, and even withdrawal,
 
though tradition may mitigate against precipitous action by the central government in
 
areas where local privileges have been established. Still, as the English experience has
 
shown, even powerful traditions supporting local autonomy have not stood in the way
 
of great reconcentration of power by democratically elected parliaments when such action
 
has been deemed necessary by a national majority.
 
  
 
==== Mature and Emergent Federal Systems ====
 
==== Mature and Emergent Federal Systems ====
Several studies (Macmahon 1955; Wheare [1946] 1964) have attempted to draw distinctions
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Several studies (Macmahon 1955; Wheare [1946] 1964) have attempted to draw distinctions between mature and emergent federal systems. The thrust of their argument is that federalism, when used to unify separate political systems to form a new nation, and federalism as a form of decentralized government in an established nation encourage markedly different kinds of political behavior. In the former case, federalism serves as a means to bring tenuous unity to nations composed of highly autonomous polities, with the locus of power remaining among the constituent units. As federal systems mature, so the argument goes, power is increasingly concentrated at the center, and federalism remains only to promote a certain amount of decentralization within an otherwise highly unified political system. Wheare goes so far as to argue that federalism is a transitional phenomenon useful in promoting progressively larger polities, which are then gradually discarded (in fact, if not in form) as an unnecessary encumbrance. This argument may have some validity in describing the history of nonfederal political systems that have utilized federal principles to promote national unity. For example, it can be used to describe the evolution of the United Kingdom into its present constitutional state. It cannot be applied, however, to any of the three exemplary federal systems—Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. Their national ties existed from the first, and their national governments were granted broad powers at the outset. Nor has federalism declined in importance as those nations have matured. There are undoubtedly differences between mature and emergent federal systems, but those differences are more likely to relate to the character of conflict and negotiation between the general and constituent governments than to their relative strengths.
between mature and emergent federal systems. The thrust of their argument
 
is that federalism, when used to unify separate political systems to form a new nation,
 
and federalism as a form of decentralized government in an established nation encourage
 
markedly different kinds of political behavior. In the former case, federalism
 
serves as a means to bring tenuous unity to nations composed of highly autonomous
 
polities, with the locus of power remaining among the constituent units. As federal systems
 
mature, so the argument goes, power is increasingly concentrated at the center,
 
and federalism remains only to promote a certain amount of decentralization within an
 
otherwise highly unified political system. Wheare goes so far as to argue that federalism
 
is a transitional phenomenon useful in promoting progressively larger polities,
 
which are then gradually discarded (in fact, if not in form) as an unnecessary encumbrance.
 
This argument may have some validity in describing the history of nonfederal
 
political systems that have utilized federal principles to promote national unity. For example,
 
it can be used to describe the evolution of the United Kingdom into its present
 
constitutional state. It cannot be applied, however, to any of the three exemplary federal
 
systems—Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. Their national ties existed
 
from the first, and their national governments were granted broad powers at the outset.
 
Nor has federalism declined in importance as those nations have matured. There are
 
undoubtedly differences between mature and emergent federal systems, but those
 
differences are more likely to relate to the character of conflict and negotiation between
 
the general and constituent governments than to their relative strengths.
 
  
 
==== Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations ====
 
==== Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations ====
Because the study of federalism at its most immediately empirical level heavily stresses
+
Because the study of federalism at its most immediately empirical level heavily stresses the study of intergovernmental relations, the two are often considered to be synonymous. Federalism, however, is something much more than the relationships between governmental units, involving as it does principles that are designed to establish the proper character of those relationships and that must also affect the character of other political institutions within federal systems. As already indicated, federalism concerns the way in which federal principles influence party and electoral systems in federal polities just as much as it concerns the way in which local governments relate to their regional or national ones, or to each other. Moreover, the study of intergovernmental relations exists apart from the study of federalism, since such relationships are to be found in all political systems, federal or otherwise, where there is more than one government extant within a given polity.
the study of intergovernmental relations, the two are often considered to be synonymous.
 
Federalism, however, is something much more than the relationships between
 
governmental units, involving as it does principles that are designed to establish the
 
proper character of those relationships and that must also affect the character of other
 
political institutions within federal systems. As already indicated, federalism concerns
 
the way in which federal principles influence party and electoral systems in federal
 
polities just as much as it concerns the way in which local governments relate to their
 
regional or national ones, or to each other. Moreover, the study of intergovernmental
 
relations exists apart from the study of federalism, since such relationships are to be
 
found in all political systems, federal or otherwise, where there is more than one government
 
extant within a given polity.
 
  
 
=== CHARACTERISTICS AND OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES ===
 
=== CHARACTERISTICS AND OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES ===
The most useful way to attempt to understand federalism as a political phenomenon is
+
The most useful way to attempt to understand federalism as a political phenomenon is to under—take a survey of the basic characteristics of federal systems, principles, and processes in order to understand both the manner and the direction of their development.
to under—take a survey of the basic characteristics of federal systems, principles, and
 
processes in order to understand both the manner and the direction of their development.
 
  
As a first step, it seems necessary to identify the various federal systems that exist
+
As a first step, it seems necessary to identify the various federal systems that exist today or have existed in the past; only then can we analyze them as operating political systems. However, identifying federal systems is no simple matter, as we have just seen. The difficulties are heightened by the wide functional differences easily observed in the various political systems that call themselves federal and by the often greater operational similarities between self-styled “federal” and “unitary” systems. Contrast, for example, the political systerns of Australia and the Soviet Union, Canada and Mexico, and Switzerland and Yugoslavia, or compare the United States and Great Britain.
today or have existed in the past; only then can we analyze them as operating political
 
systems. However, identifying federal systems is no simple matter, as we have just seen.
 
The difficulties are heightened by the wide functional differences easily observed in
 
the various political systems that call themselves federal and by the often greater operational
 
similarities between self-styled “federal” and “unitary” systems. Contrast, for
 
example, the political systerns of Australia and the Soviet Union, Canada and Mexico,
 
and Switzerland and Yugoslavia, or compare the United States and Great Britain.
 
  
Moreover, federal systems have historically been marked by great internal distinctions
+
Moreover, federal systems have historically been marked by great internal distinctions between theory and practice, perhaps more so than other political systems. In the United States, the measure of the maintenance of federalism was long considered to be the degree of separation of government activities by level, because it was generally believed that such separation actually existed. In fact, American federalism from the first had been characterized by extensive intergovernmental functional collaboration within the framework of separate governmental structures (Elazar 1962). Similarly, the Canadian federal system has always been described as one in which the federal government is clearly dominant—the repository of all powers not explicitly granted to the provinces. Yet since the brief period of federal supremacy in the years immediately following confederation, the provinces have consistently gained power at federal expense (Smiley 1965). The Russian federal constitution went so far as to grant each Soviet republic the right of secession—a patent impossibility under the realities of the Russian political system.
between theory and practice, perhaps more so than other political systems. In the
 
United States, the measure of the maintenance of federalism was long considered to
 
be the degree of separation of government activities by level, because it was generally
 
believed that such separation actually existed. In fact, American federalism from the
 
first had been characterized by extensive intergovernmental functional collaboration
 
within the framework of separate governmental structures (Elazar 1962). Similarly, the
 
Canadian federal system has always been described as one in which the federal government
 
is clearly dominant—the repository of all powers not explicitly granted to the
 
provinces. Yet since the brief period of federal supremacy in the years immediately following
 
confederation, the provinces have consistently gained power at federal expense
 
(Smiley 1965). The Russian federal constitution went so far as to grant each Soviet republic
 
the right of secession—a patent impossibility under the realities of the Russian
 
political system.
 
  
Nevertheless, some basic characteristics and operational principles common to all
+
Nevertheless, some basic characteristics and operational principles common to all truly federal systems can be identified, and can help us to define such systems. These may be divided into three essential elements and a number of supplementary ones.
truly federal systems can be identified, and can help us to define such systems. These
 
may be divided into three essential elements and a number of supplementary ones.
 
  
 
==== Written Constitution ====
 
==== Written Constitution ====
First, the federal relationship must be established or confirmed through a perpetual
+
First, the federal relationship must be established or confirmed through a perpetual covenant of union, inevitably embodied in a written constitution that outlines, among other things, the terms by which power is divided or shared in the political system and that can be altered only by extraordinary procedures. Every existing federal nation possesses a written constitution, as do most of the other nations incorporating elements of the federal principle. Juridically, federal constitutions are distinctive in that they are not simply compacts between the rulers and the ruled but involve the people, the general government, and the polities constituting the federal union. Moreover, the constituent polities retain local constitution-making rights of their own.
covenant of union, inevitably embodied in a written constitution that outlines, among
 
other things, the terms by which power is divided or shared in the political system and
 
that can be altered only by extraordinary procedures. Every existing federal nation possesses
 
a written constitution, as do most of the other nations incorporating elements of
 
the federal principle. Juridically, federal constitutions are distinctive in that they are not
 
simply compacts between the rulers and the ruled but involve the people, the general
 
government, and the polities constituting the federal union. Moreover, the constituent
 
polities retain local constitution-making rights of their own.
 
  
 
==== Noncentralization ====
 
==== Noncentralization ====
The political system must reinforce the terms of the constitution through an actual diffusion
+
The political system must reinforce the terms of the constitution through an actual diffusion of power among a number of substantially self-sustaining centers that are generally coincident with the constituent polities established by the federal compact. Such a diffusion of power may be termed “noncentralization.” It differs from decentralization— the conditional diffusion of specific powers to subordinate local governments by a central government, subject to recall by unilateral decision. It is also more than devolution— the special grant of powers to a subnational unit by a central government, not normally rescindable. Noncentralization ensures that no matter how certain powers may be shared by the general and constituent governments at any point in time, the authority to participate in exercising them cannot be taken away from either without mutual consent. Constituent polities in federal systems are able to participate as partners in national governmental activities and to act unilaterally with a high degree of autonomy in areas constitutionally open to them—even on crucial questions and, to a degree, in opposition to national policies, because they possess effectively irrevocable powers.
of power among a number of substantially self-sustaining centers that are generally
 
coincident with the constituent polities established by the federal compact. Such
 
a diffusion of power may be termed “noncentralization.” It differs from decentralization—
 
the conditional diffusion of specific powers to subordinate local governments by
 
a central government, subject to recall by unilateral decision. It is also more than devolution—
 
the special grant of powers to a subnational unit by a central government,
 
not normally rescindable. Noncentralization ensures that no matter how certain powers
 
may be shared by the general and constituent governments at any point in time, the
 
authority to participate in exercising them cannot be taken away from either without
 
mutual consent. Constituent polities in federal systems are able to participate as partners
 
in national governmental activities and to act unilaterally with a high degree of
 
autonomy in areas constitutionally open to them—even on crucial questions and, to a
 
degree, in opposition to national policies, because they possess effectively irrevocable
 
powers.
 
  
 
==== Areal Division of Power ====
 
==== Areal Division of Power ====
A third element that appears to be essential in any federal system is the internal division
+
A third element that appears to be essential in any federal system is the internal division of authority and power on an areal basis (Maass 1959), what in the United States has been called “territorial democracy.” It is theoretically possible to create a federal system whose constituent units are fixed but not territorially based. There were premodern protofederations of nomadic tribes, and some observers have seen federal elements in nations constitutionally structured to accommodate social and political divisions along ethnic, religious, or even ideological lines. Nevertheless, no authentic federal system has existed without an areal basis for the federal division. Historically, when areal divisions of power have given way to divisions on the basis of functional interest, federalism has been replaced by pluralism. In modern democratic theory the argument between [[Federalists]] and [[Anti-Federalists]] has frequently revolved around the respective values of areal and functional diffusions of power. Theorists who have argued the obsolescence of federalism while endorsing the values used to justify its existence have generally based their case on the superior utility of pluralism (Mogi 1931, 1059–115). Proponents of the federal-areal division argue that the deficiencies of territorial democracy are greatly overshadowed by the neutrality of areal representation of functional interests, and they argue further that any other system devised for giving power to these interests has proved unable to cope with the complexities and changes of interest endemic in a dynamic age while certainly limiting the advantages for local differentiation inherent in the areal system.
of authority and power on an areal basis (Maass 1959), what in the United States
 
has been called “territorial democracy.” It is theoretically possible to create a federal
 
system whose constituent units are fixed but not territorially based. There were premodern
 
protofederations of nomadic tribes, and some observers have seen federal elements
 
in nations constitutionally structured to accommodate social and political
 
divisions along ethnic, religious, or even ideological lines. Nevertheless, no authentic
 
federal system has existed without an areal basis for the federal division. Historically,
 
when areal divisions of power have given way to divisions on the basis of functional
 
interest, federalism has been replaced by pluralism. In modern democratic theory the
 
argument between Federalists and Anti-Federalists has frequently revolved around the
 
respective values of areal and functional diffusions of power. Theorists who have argued
 
the obsolescence of federalism while endorsing the values used to justify its existence
 
have generally based their case on the superior utility of pluralism (Mogi 1931,
 
1059–115). Proponents of the federal-areal division argue that the deficiencies of territorial
 
democracy are greatly overshadowed by the neutrality of areal representation
 
of functional interests, and they argue further that any other system devised for giving
 
power to these interests has proved unable to cope with the complexities and changes
 
of interest endemic in a dynamic age while certainly limiting the advantages for local
 
differentiation inherent in the areal system.
 
  
Studies of federal systems indicate the existence of other elements that supplement
+
Studies of federal systems indicate the existence of other elements that supplement the three basic ones. While all of them are not always present in every federal system, their near universality leads one to the conclusion that they serve important functions in the maintenance of federalism in each. Similarly, while many of them are found individually in various kinds of political systems, it is their combination within a single system structured around the basic elements that is characteristic of federalism.
the three basic ones. While all of them are not always present in every federal system,
 
their near universality leads one to the conclusion that they serve important functions
 
in the maintenance of federalism in each. Similarly, while many of them are found individually
 
in various kinds of political systems, it is their combination within a single
 
system structured around the basic elements that is characteristic of federalism.
 
  
 
==== Maintaining Union ====
 
==== Maintaining Union ====
Generally characteristic of modern federal systems are direct lines of communication
+
Generally characteristic of modern federal systems are direct lines of communication between the public and both the general and the constituent governments, which allow the public to exert direct influence on both governments and permit them to exercise direct authority over a common citizenry. The people may (and usually do) elect representatives to all governments that serve them. All of the governments may (and usually do) administer programs so as to serve the individual citizen directly. The courts may serve both levels of government, applying the relevant laws directly.
between the public and both the general and the constituent governments, which allow
 
the public to exert direct influence on both governments and permit them to exercise
 
direct authority over a common citizenry. The people may (and usually do) elect representatives
 
to all governments that serve them. All of the governments may (and usually
 
do) administer programs so as to serve the individual citizen directly. The courts
 
may serve both levels of government, applying the relevant laws directly.
 
  
The existence of those direct lines of communication—one of the major features distinguishing
+
The existence of those direct lines of communication—one of the major features distinguishing federations from leagues—is usually predicated on the existence of a sense of common nationality binding the constituent polities and peoples of federal nations together, another element requisite for the maintenance of a successful federal system. In some countries this sense has been inherited, but in most it has had to be invented. Federalism in Germany has been based on a common sense of an inherited German nationhood. In the United States, Argentina, and Australia, a sense of nationhood had to be at least partly invented. National consciousness soon became second nature in those countries, since none of their constituent states ever had much more than a partially developed national consciousness of its own. Canada, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia have had to invent a sense of common nationality strong enough to embrace “nationality groups” whose intense national feelings are rooted in the constituent polities. In such newly formed federal systems as India, Malaysia, and Nigeria, the future of federalism is endangered by the absence of a common sense of nationality. Contrary to some theories, federalism has not proved to be a particularly good device for integrating diverse nationalities into a single political system unless it has been accompanied by other factors compelling integration.
federations from leagues—is usually predicated on the existence of a sense
 
of common nationality binding the constituent polities and peoples of federal nations
 
together, another element requisite for the maintenance of a successful federal system.
 
In some countries this sense has been inherited, but in most it has had to be invented.
 
Federalism in Germany has been based on a common sense of an inherited German
 
nationhood. In the United States, Argentina, and Australia, a sense of nationhood had
 
to be at least partly invented. National consciousness soon became second nature in
 
those countries, since none of their constituent states ever had much more than a partially
 
developed national consciousness of its own. Canada, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia
 
have had to invent a sense of common nationality strong enough to embrace “nationality
 
groups” whose intense national feelings are rooted in the constituent polities. In
 
such newly formed federal systems as India, Malaysia, and Nigeria, the future of federalism
 
is endangered by the absence of a common sense of nationality. Contrary to
 
some theories, federalism has not proved to be a particularly good device for integrating
 
diverse nationalities into a single political system unless it has been accompanied
 
by other factors compelling integration.
 
  
Geographic necessity has been a major factor promoting the maintenance of union
+
Geographic necessity has been a major factor promoting the maintenance of union within federal systems, even in the face of strong pressures toward disunion. The Mississippi Valley in the United States, the Alps in Switzerland, the island character of the Australian continent, and the mountains and jungles surrounding Brazil have served as direct geographic influences promoting unity. More political than “natural,” but no less compelling geographically, have been the pressures for Canadian union generated by that country’s neighbor to the south or for the federation of the German states generated by their neighbors to the east and west.
within federal systems, even in the face of strong pressures toward disunion. The Mississippi
 
Valley in the United States, the Alps in Switzerland, the island character of the
 
Australian continent, and the mountains and jungles surrounding Brazil have served as
 
direct geographic influences promoting unity. More political than “natural,” but no less
 
compelling geographically, have been the pressures for Canadian union generated by
 
that country’s neighbor to the south or for the federation of the German states generated
 
by their neighbors to the east and west.
 
  
 
==== Maintaining Noncentralization ====
 
==== Maintaining Noncentralization ====
It has been well demonstrated that the constituent polities in a federal system must be
+
It has been well demonstrated that the constituent polities in a federal system must be fairly equal in population and wealth, or at least balanced geographically or numerically in their inequalities, if noncentralization is to be maintained. The United States has been able to overcome its internal inequities because each geographic section has included both great and small states. In Canada, the ethnic differences between the two largest provinces have served to inject balance into the system. The existence of groups of cantons in different size categories has helped maintain Swiss federalism. Similar distributions exist in every other system whose federal character is not in question.
fairly equal in population and wealth, or at least balanced geographically or numerically
 
in their inequalities, if noncentralization is to be maintained. The United States
 
has been able to overcome its internal inequities because each geographic section has
 
included both great and small states. In Canada, the ethnic differences between the two
 
largest provinces have served to inject balance into the system. The existence of groups
 
of cantons in different size categories has helped maintain Swiss federalism. Similar
 
distributions exist in every other system whose federal character is not in question.
 
  
The existence of a large polity dominating smaller states with which it is nominally
+
The existence of a large polity dominating smaller states with which it is nominally federated on equal terms has often been one of the major reasons for the failure of federalism. In the German federal empire of the late nineteenth century, Prussia was so obviously dominant that the other states had little opportunity to provide national leadership or even a reasonably strong hedge against the desires of its king and government. Similarly, even without the problem of the Communist Party, the existence of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, which occupied three-fourths of the area and contained three-fifths of the population of the Soviet Union, would have severely crippled the possibilities of maintaining authentic federal relationships in that country.
federated on equal terms has often been one of the major reasons for the failure of federalism.
 
In the German federal empire of the late nineteenth century, Prussia was so
 
obviously dominant that the other states had little opportunity to provide national leadership
 
or even a reasonably strong hedge against the desires of its king and government.
 
Similarly, even without the problem of the Communist Party, the existence of the
 
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, which occupied three-fourths of the area
 
and contained three-fifths of the population of the Soviet Union, would have severely
 
crippled the possibilities of maintaining authentic federal relationships in that country.
 
  
Successful federal systems have also been characterized by the permanence of the
+
Successful federal systems have also been characterized by the permanence of the boundaries of their constituent units. This does not mean that boundary changes cannot occur, but it does mean that as a matter of constitutional law such changes can be made only with the consent of the polities involved and that, as a matter of political policy, they are avoided except in the most extreme situations. Boundary changes have occurred in the “classic” federal systems—the United States divided Virginia during the [[Civil War]], Canada has enlarged the boundaries of its provinces, and Switzerland has divided cantons—but they have been the exception rather than the rule, and in every case at least the formal consent of the constituent polities was given. Even in weaker federal systems, such as those of Latin America, state boundaries have tended to remain relatively secure. When boundary changes have been made, as in the postwar redrawing of ''Lander'' boundaries in West Germany to account for the diminished territory of the Federal Republic and the alteration of state lines to recognize linguistic unities in India, the essential heartlands of the polities involved have been preserved.
boundaries of their constituent units. This does not mean that boundary changes cannot
 
occur, but it does mean that as a matter of constitutional law such changes can be
 
made only with the consent of the polities involved and that, as a matter of political
 
policy, they are avoided except in the most extreme situations. Boundary changes have
 
occurred in the “classic” federal systems—the United States divided Virginia during
 
the Civil War, Canada has enlarged the boundaries of its provinces, and Switzerland
 
has divided cantons—but they have been the exception rather than the rule, and in every
 
case at least the formal consent of the constituent polities was given. Even in weaker
 
federal systems, such as those of Latin America, state boundaries have tended to remain relatively secure. When boundary changes have been made, as in the postwar redrawing
 
of Lander boundaries in West Germany to account for the diminished territory
 
of the Federal Republic and the alteration of state lines to recognize linguistic
 
unities in India, the essential heartlands of the polities involved have been preserved.
 
  
In a few very important cases, noncentralization is both reflected and supported
+
In a few very important cases, noncentralization is both reflected and supported through the constitutionally guaranteed existence of different systems of law in the constituent polities. Though the differences in those systems are likely to be somewhat eroded over time—the extent of their preservation varying from system to system— their continued existence as separate systems and the national mixture of laws that their existence promotes act as great bulwarks against centralization. In the United States, each state’s legal system stems directly and to a certain extent uniquely from English law, while federal law occupies only an interstitial position binding the systems of the 50 states together insofar as necessary. The resulting mixture of laws keeps the administration of justice, even in federal courts, substantially noncentralized (Macmahon 1955, ch. 11). In Canada, the existence of common law and civil law systems side by side is one constitutional guarantee of French Canadian cultural survival. Noncentralized legal systems, a particularly Anglo-American device, are often used in legislative as well as federal unions. They are rare in other political cultures and have become less common in all federal systems established since 1900. More common is the provision for modification of national legal codes by the subnational governments to meet special local needs, as in Switzerland.
through the constitutionally guaranteed existence of different systems of law in the constituent
 
polities. Though the differences in those systems are likely to be somewhat
 
eroded over time—the extent of their preservation varying from system to system—
 
their continued existence as separate systems and the national mixture of laws that their
 
existence promotes act as great bulwarks against centralization. In the United States,
 
each state’s legal system stems directly and to a certain extent uniquely from English
 
law, while federal law occupies only an interstitial position binding the systems of the
 
50 states together insofar as necessary. The resulting mixture of laws keeps the administration
 
of justice, even in federal courts, substantially noncentralized (Macmahon
 
1955, ch. 11). In Canada, the existence of common law and civil law systems side by
 
side is one constitutional guarantee of French Canadian cultural survival. Noncentralized
 
legal systems, a particularly Anglo-American device, are often used in legislative
 
as well as federal unions. They are rare in other political cultures and have become less
 
common in all federal systems established since 1900. More common is the provision
 
for modification of national legal codes by the subnational governments to meet special
 
local needs, as in Switzerland.
 
  
The point is generally well taken that unless the constituent polities have substantial
+
The point is generally well taken that unless the constituent polities have substantial influence over the formal or informal amending process, the federal character of the system is open to question. Since many constitutional changes are made without recourse to formal constitutional amendment, the position of the constituent polities must be additionally protected by a constitution designed so that any serious changes in the political order can be made only by the decision of dispersed majorities that reflect the areal division of powers. This protection, which federal theorists have argued is important for popular government as well as for federalism (Diamond 1963), is a feature of the most truly federal systems.
influence over the formal or informal amending process, the federal character of the
 
system is open to question. Since many constitutional changes are made without recourse
 
to formal constitutional amendment, the position of the constituent polities must
 
be additionally protected by a constitution designed so that any serious changes in the
 
political order can be made only by the decision of dispersed majorities that reflect the
 
areal division of powers. This protection, which federal theorists have argued is important
 
for popular government as well as for federalism (Diamond 1963), is a feature
 
of the most truly federal systems.
 
  
Noncentralization is strengthened in all federal systems by giving the constituent
+
Noncentralization is strengthened in all federal systems by giving the constituent polities guaranteed representation in the national legislature and, often, by giving them a guaranteed role in the national political process. In some federal systems, notably those of the United States and Switzerland, the latter is guaranteed in the written constitution. In others, such as Canada and those in Latin America, certain powers of participation have been acquired and have become part of the traditional constitution.
polities guaranteed representation in the national legislature and, often, by giving them
 
a guaranteed role in the national political process. In some federal systems, notably
 
those of the United States and Switzerland, the latter is guaranteed in the written constitution.
 
In others, such as Canada and those in Latin America, certain powers of participation
 
have been acquired and have become part of the traditional constitution.
 
  
Recent studies have shown that the existence of a noncentralized party system is perhaps
+
Recent studies have shown that the existence of a noncentralized party system is perhaps the most important single element in the maintenance of federal noncentralization (Macmahon 1955). Noncentralized parties initially develop because of the constitutional arrangements of the federal compact, but once they have come into existence, they tend to be self-perpetuating and to function as decentralizing forces in their own right.
the most important single element in the maintenance of federal noncentralization
 
(Macmahon 1955). Noncentralized parties initially develop because of the
 
constitutional arrangements of the federal compact, but once they have come into existence,
 
they tend to be self-perpetuating and to function as decentralizing forces in
 
their own right.
 
  
The United States and Canada provide two examples of the different forms that can
+
The United States and Canada provide two examples of the different forms that can be assumed by a noncentralized party system. In the United States, where party responsibility is minimal and virtually nonexistent on the national level, a two-party system has developed, with the parties actually being coalitions of the several state or, in some cases, local party organizations functioning as national units only for the quadrennial presidential elections or for purposes of organizing the national Congress. Party financing and decision making are functions that are dispersed either among the state organizations or among widely divergent factions operating nationwide. In Canada, on the other hand, the parliamentary form of government, with its concomitant requirement of party responsibility, means that at the national level considerably more party cohesiveness must be maintained simply in order to gain and hold power.
be assumed by a noncentralized party system. In the United States, where party responsibility
 
is minimal and virtually nonexistent on the national level, a two-party system
 
has developed, with the parties actually being coalitions of the several state or, in
 
some cases, local party organizations functioning as national units only for the quadrennial
 
presidential elections or for purposes of organizing the national Congress. Party
 
financing and decision making are functions that are dispersed either among the state
 
organizations or among widely divergent factions operating nationwide. In Canada, on
 
the other hand, the parliamentary form of government, with its concomitant requirement
 
of party responsibility, means that at the national level considerably more party
 
cohesiveness must be maintained simply in order to gain and hold power.
 
  
The noncentralized party system in Canada has developed through a fragmentation
+
The noncentralized party system in Canada has developed through a fragmentation of the parties along regional or provincial lines. The parties with nationwide bases are still divided internally along provincial lines, with each provincial organization autonomous. Individual provinces are frequently dominated by regional parties that send only a few representatives to the national legislature, adding to the fragmentation of the system. Very often, the party victorious in national elections is the one that is briefly able to expand its base to most nearly national proportions.
of the parties along regional or provincial lines. The parties with nationwide bases are
 
still divided internally along provincial lines, with each provincial organization autonomous.
 
Individual provinces are frequently dominated by regional parties that send
 
only a few representatives to the national legislature, adding to the fragmentation of
 
the system. Very often, the party victorious in national elections is the one that is briefly
 
able to expand its base to most nearly national proportions.
 
  
European-style federal systems where parliamentary government is the norm follow
+
European-style federal systems where parliamentary government is the norm follow the Canadian model. Australia and Switzerland come closest to paralleling it, and traces of it can be found in the German Federal Republic. A more centralized variation of the same pattern exists in countries like India, in which the national government is dominated by one very large and diffused national party that is held together nationally by personal leadership but is quite factionalized in the states where it must share the governing power with other parties.
the Canadian model. Australia and Switzerland come closest to paralleling it, and traces
 
of it can be found in the German Federal Republic. A more centralized variation of the
 
same pattern exists in countries like India, in which the national government is dominated
 
by one very large and diffuse national party that is held together nationally by
 
personal leadership but is quite factionalized in the states where it must share the governing
 
power with other parties.
 
  
Federal nations with less developed party systems frequently gain some of the same
+
Federal nations with less developed party systems frequently gain some of the same decentralizing effects through what Latin Americans call ''caudillismo''—noncentralized personal leadership systems that diffuse power through strong local leaders operating in the constituent polities. Caudillistic noncentralization is most characteristic of Latin American federal systems but apparently exists in such new federations as Nigeria and Malaysia as well.
decentralizing effects through what Latin Americans call caudillismo—noncentralized
 
personal leadership systems that diffuse power through strong local leaders operating
 
in the constituent polities. Caudillistic noncentralization is most characteristic of Latin
 
American federal systems but apparently exists in such new federations as Nigeria and
 
Malaysia as well.
 
  
The importance to federalism of a noncentralized party system is well illustrated by
+
The importance to federalism of a noncentralized party system is well illustrated by contrast with those formally federal nations dominated by one highly centralized party, such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Mexico. In all three cases, the dominant party has operated to limit the power of the constituent polities in direct proportion to the extent of its dominance.
contrast with those formally federal nations dominated by one highly centralized party,
 
such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Mexico. In all three cases, the dominant
 
party has operated to limit the power of the constituent polities in direct proportion to
 
the extent of its dominance.
 
  
Ultimately, however, noncentralization is maintained to the extent that there is respect
+
Ultimately, however, noncentralization is maintained to the extent that there is respect for the federal principle within each federal system. Such respect is necessarily reflected in the immediate recognition by the decision-making publics that the preservation of the constituent polities is as important as the preservation of the nation as a whole. In the words of the American Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, federalism looks to “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States” (''[[Texas v. White]]'' 1869). This recognition may be based on loyalty to particular constituent polities or on an understanding of the role played by federalism in animating the political system along certain unique lines. Thus, those who value government by conciliation and partnership, with emphasis on local control, are likely to have respect for the federal principle.
for the federal principle within each federal system. Such respect is necessarily
 
reflected in the immediate recognition by the decision-making publics that the preservation
 
of the constituent polities is as important as the preservation of the nation as a
 
whole. In the words of the American Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, federalism looks
 
to “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States” (Texas v. White 1869).
 
This recognition may be based on loyalty to particular constituent polities or on an understanding
 
of the role played by federalism in animating the political system along
 
certain unique lines. Thus, those who value government by conciliation and partnership,
 
with emphasis on local control, are likely to have respect for the federal principle.
 
  
Citizens of a federal nation must show that respect in two ways, by showing selfrestraint
+
Citizens of a federal nation must show that respect in two ways, by showing self-restraint and by cultivating the political art of negotiation. Federalism can exist only where there is considerable tolerance of diversity and willingness to take political action through conciliation even when the power to act unilaterally is available. The usual prerequisite to action in federal systems is the ability to build consensus rather than the power to threaten coercion. Western federal nations can furnish many examples of the exercise of national self-restraint in dealing with difficult federal problems. Even in a federal system as centralized as that of India, the constitutional right of the national government to assume control of the state governments is exercised as little as possible—notably when the Communists win local elections—and is then clearly a temporary action.
and by cultivating the political art of negotiation. Federalism can exist only
 
where there is considerable tolerance of diversity and willingness to take political action
 
through conciliation even when the power to act unilaterally is available. The usual
 
prerequisite to action in federal systems is the ability to build consensus rather than
 
the power to threaten coercion. Western federal nations can furnish many examples of
 
the exercise of national self-restraint in dealing with difficult federal problems. Even
 
in a federal system as centralized as that of India, the constitutional right of the national government to assume control of the state governments is exercised as little as
 
possible—notably when the Communists win local elections—and is then clearly a temporary
 
action.
 
  
The historical record indicates that the dual purpose implied in Chase’s dictum has
+
The historical record indicates that the dual purpose implied in Chase’s dictum has been at least as responsible for the creation of federal systems as has the single interest in political unification. The Canadian confederation came into being not only to create a new nation out of the British North American colonies but also to give Ontario and Quebec autonomous political systems of their own. Similarly, every move toward greater union in the Swiss confederation has been made in order to preserve the independence of the cantons from both outside encroachment and revolutionary centralism (Sharma 1953, 269–75). A good case can be made that similar motivations were important in the creation of Australia, Malaysia, Nigeria, and the United States.
been at least as responsible for the creation of federal systems as has the single interest
 
in political unification. The Canadian confederation came into being not only to
 
create a new nation out of the British North American colonies but also to give Ontario
 
and Quebec autonomous political systems of their own. Similarly, every move
 
toward greater union in the Swiss confederation has been made in order to preserve
 
the independence of the cantons from both outside encroachment and revolutionary
 
centralism (Sharma 1953, 269–75). A good case can be made that similar motivations
 
were important in the creation of Australia, Malaysia, Nigeria, and the United States.
 
  
 
==== Maintaining the Federal Principle ====
 
==== Maintaining the Federal Principle ====
Several of the devices commonly found in federal systems serve to maintain the federal
+
Several of the devices commonly found in federal systems serve to maintain the federal principle per se and are consequently supportive of both the national government and the constituent polities. Two of these are particularly common and important.
principle per se and are consequently supportive of both the national government
 
and the constituent polities. Two of these are particularly common and important.
 
  
The maintenance of federalism requires that the nation and its constituent polities
+
The maintenance of federalism requires that the nation and its constituent polities each have a substantially complete set of governing institutions of their own with the right—within limits set by the compact—to modify those institutions unilaterally. Separate legislative and administrative institutions are both necessary. This does not necessarily mean that all governmental activities must be carried out by separate institutions at each level. It is possible for the agencies of one government to serve as agents of the other by mutual agreement. But each government must have the needed institutions to function independently in the areas of its authority and the structural resources to cooperate freely with the other government’s counterpart agencies.
each have a substantially complete set of governing institutions of their own with the
 
right—within limits set by the compact—to modify those institutions unilaterally. Separate
 
legislative and administrative institutions are both necessary. This does not necessarily
 
mean that all governmental activities must be carried out by separate
 
institutions at each level. It is possible for the agencies of one government to serve as
 
agents of the other by mutual agreement. But each government must have the needed
 
institutions to function independently in the areas of its authority and the structural resources
 
to cooperate freely with the other government’s counterpart agencies.
 
  
In this regard, the contractual sharing of public responsibilities by all governments
+
In this regard, the contractual sharing of public responsibilities by all governments in the system appears to be a central characteristic of federalism. Sharing, broadly conceived, includes common involvement in policy making, financing, and administration of government activities. In contemporary federal systems, it is characterized by extensive intergovernmental collaboration. Sharing can be based on highly formal arrangements or informal agreements. In federal systems, it is usually contractual in nature. The contract—politically a limited expression of the compact principle—is used in formal arrangements as a legal device to enable governments responsible to separate polities to engage in joint action while remaining independent entities. Even where government agencies cooperate without formally contracting to do so, the spirit of federalism that pervades ongoing federal systems tends to infuse the participating parties with a sense of contractual obligation.
in the system appears to be a central characteristic of federalism. Sharing, broadly conceived,
 
includes common involvement in policy making, financing, and administration
 
of government activities. In contemporary federal systems, it is characterized by extensive
 
intergovernmental collaboration. Sharing can be based on highly formal
 
arrangements or informal agreements. In federal systems, it is usually contractual in
 
nature. The contract—politically a limited expression of the compact principle—is used
 
in formal arrangements as a legal device to enable governments responsible to separate
 
polities to engage in joint action while remaining independent entities. Even where
 
government agencies cooperate without formally contracting to do so, the spirit of federalism
 
that pervades ongoing federal systems tends to infuse the participating parties
 
with a sense of contractual obligation.
 
  
In any federal system, it is likely that there will be continued tension between the
+
In any federal system, it is likely that there will be continued tension between the federal government and the constituent polities over the years and that different “balances” between them will develop at different times. The existence of this tension is an integral part of the federal relationship, and its character does much to determine the future of federalism in each system. The question of federal-state relations that it produces is perennially a matter of public concern because virtually all other political issues arising in a federal system are phrased in terms of their implications for federalism. In this way, federalism imposes a way of looking at problems that stands apart from the substantive issues raised by the problems themselves. This is particularly true of those issues that affect the very fabric of society. In the United States, for example, the race question is a problem of federal-state as well as black-white relations, and the same is true of the cultural question in Canada and the linguistic question in India.
federal government and the constituent polities over the years and that different “balances”
 
between them will develop at different times. The existence of this tension is
 
an integral part of the federal relationship, and its character does much to determine
 
the future of federalism in each system. The question of federal-state relations that it
 
produces is perennially a matter of public concern because virtually all other political
 
issues arising in a federal system are phrased in terms of their implications for federalism.
 
In this way, federalism imposes a way of looking at problems that stands apart
 
from the substantive issues raised by the problems themselves. This is particularly true
 
of those issues that affect the very fabric of society. In the United States, for example,
 
the race question is a problem of federal-state as well as black-white relations, and the
 
same is true of the cultural question in Canada and the linguistic question in India.
 
  
 
==== The End Product ====
 
==== The End Product ====
The very terminology of federalism is characterized by a revealing ambiguity that is
+
The very terminology of federalism is characterized by a revealing ambiguity that is indicative of the end product of federal systems. The word “federalize” is used to describe the unification of “sovereign” states into a federal polity and also the permanent devolution of authority and power within a nation to subnational governments. In this ambiguity lies the essence of the federal principle—the perpetuation of both union and noncentralization.
indicative of the end product of federal systems. The word “federalize” is used to describe
 
the unification of “sovereign” states into a federal polity and also the permanent
 
devolution of authority and power within a nation to subnational governments. In this
 
ambiguity lies the essence of the federal principle—the perpetuation of both union and
 
noncentralization.
 
  
Viewed from the top, the combination of the elements discussed above results in a
+
Viewed from the top, the combination of the elements discussed above results in a federal rather than a central government, that is, a government composed of a nationwide coalition of political institutions, some with predominantly local power bases (such as the national legislature), and others with predominantly national power bases (such as the national bureaucracy). This government, whose power is thus diffused vertically and laterally, functions in cooperation with the constituent polities that it must conciliate in order to act. Decision making is characterized by heavy reliance upon negotiation and bargaining and by minimal reliance upon the exercise of force. Operations are characterized by a measure of disorder, since noncentralization breeds multiple power centers located at or cutting across all levels of government. Each of these centers seeks to keep open routes of access to the others, usually succeeding because it is in the best interests of all to maintain this kind of disorder as part of the “rules of the game.”
federal rather than a central government, that is, a government composed of a nationwide
 
coalition of political institutions, some with predominantly local power bases
 
(such as the national legislature), and others with predominantly national power bases
 
(such as the national bureaucracy). This government, whose power is thus diffused vertically
 
and laterally, functions in cooperation with the constituent polities that it must
 
conciliate in order to act. Decision making is characterized by heavy reliance upon negotiation
 
and bargaining and by minimal reliance upon the exercise of force. Operations
 
are characterized by a measure of disorder, since noncentralization breeds
 
multiple power centers located at or cutting across all levels of government. Each of
 
these centers seeks to keep open routes of access to the others, usually succeeding because
 
it is in the best interests of all to maintain this kind of disorder as part of the
 
“rules of the game.”
 
  
Viewed locally, a federal system consists of governmental inputs from different
+
Viewed locally, a federal system consists of governmental inputs from different sources whose local connections normally serve to fragment local authority. However, because such a system rewards those who actively seek to reconcile the diffuse elements and bind them together for a larger purpose, local political leaders can control these inputs to a great extent. While this may not prevent the national government from exercising great power at any given time or from increasing its total power over time, it does mean that as long as the federal principle remains operative, the public can and almost invariably does limit certain kinds of national government actions or guides such actions into particular channels (often directed toward strengthening the constituent governments) by invoking the terms of the compact.
sources whose local connections normally serve to fragment local authority. However,
 
because such a system rewards those who actively seek to reconcile the diffuse elements
 
and bind them together for a larger purpose, local political leaders can control
 
these inputs to a great extent. While this may not prevent the national government from
 
exercising great power at any given time or from increasing its total power over time,
 
it does mean that as long as the federal principle remains operative, the public can and
 
almost invariably does limit certain kinds of national government actions or guides such
 
actions into particular channels (often directed toward strengthening the constituent
 
governments) by invoking the terms of the compact.
 
  
Viewed theoretically, these patterns of behavior and the arguments advanced to justify
+
Viewed theoretically, these patterns of behavior and the arguments advanced to justify them serve to reaffirm the fundamental principles that (1) the strength of a federal polity does not stem from the power of the national government but from the authority vested in the nation as a whole, (2) both the national government and the governments of the constituent polities are possessed of delegated powers only, and (3) all governments are limited by the common national constitution.
them serve to reaffirm the fundamental principles that (1) the strength of a federal
 
polity does not stem from the power of the national government but from the authority
 
vested in the nation as a whole, (2) both the national government and the governments
 
of the constituent polities are possessed of delegated powers only, and (3) all
 
governments are limited by the common national constitution.
 
  
All this should make it apparent that federalism is a form of popular government
+
All this should make it apparent that federalism is a form of popular government embodying elements of both republicanism and democracy. The federal structures occasionally adopted by nondemocratic systems must generally be considered “window dressing” except insofar as the injection of the federal principle may serve as a democratizing force in itself. In Yugoslavia, for example, the existence of a federal superstructure has proved useful in fostering such decentralization as the Communist Party leadership wished to allow and may even have played a role in stimulating decentralizing tendencies.
embodying elements of both republicanism and democracy. The federal structures occasionally
 
adopted by nondemocratic systems must generally be considered “window
 
dressing” except insofar as the injection of the federal principle may serve as a democratizing
 
force in itself. In Yugoslavia, for example, the existence of a federal superstructure
 
has proved useful in fostering such decentralization as the Communist
 
Party leadership wished to allow and may even have played a role in stimulating decentralizing
 
tendencies.
 
  
 
=== EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT ===
 
=== EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT ===
 
==== Ancient Protofederal Systems ====
 
==== Ancient Protofederal Systems ====
Long before the term “federal” was invented, there were political systems that embodied
+
Long before the term “federal” was invented, there were political systems that embodied elements of the federal principle. The Israelite political system was probably the first example in recorded history of a union of constituent polities based on a sense of common nationality, with national and tribal political institutions and some division of functions between the two partly formalized by a written constitution. As a republic it was never able to overcome the problems of national executive leadership and succession and, after some 200 years, revised its constitution to superimpose a limited monarchy on its federal institutions. Still, as many of the seventeenth-century Federalists noted, it came closer to resembling a modern federal system than any comparable premodern nation. Its classic intellectual product, the Bible, was the first book to discuss the problems of a federal polity.
elements of the federal principle. The Israelite political system was probably
 
the first example in recorded history of a union of constituent polities based on a sense
 
of common nationality, with national and tribal political institutions and some division
 
of functions between the two partly formalized by a written constitution. As a republic
 
it was never able to overcome the problems of national executive leadership and
 
succession and, after some 200 years, revised its constitution to superimpose a limited
 
monarchy on its federal institutions. Still, as many of the seventeenth-century Federalists
 
noted, it came closer to resembling a modern federal system than any comparable
 
premodern nation. Its classic intellectual product, the Bible, was the first book to
 
discuss the problems of a federal polity.
 
  
Permanent leagues of independent states united by a sense of common need but
+
Permanent leagues of independent states united by a sense of common need but without any sense of common nationhood were found in various parts of the Greek world. They were entrusted with certain matters in the realm of foreign affairs and defense but were in every respect accountable to their member states. The classic example of this system was the Achaean League (251–146 B.C.), a protofederal system often erroneously considered to be the first federal polity (Freeman [1863] 1893). The Greeks left some descriptions of their leagues but no theoretical discussions of the league as a political system. Except for Aristotle’s criticisms, the great Greek political theorists ignored federalism as a political principle because the very idea contradicted their conception of the small, unified polis as the only basis upon which to build the good regime.
without any sense of common nationhood were found in various parts of the Greek
 
world. They were entrusted with certain matters in the realm of foreign affairs and defense
 
but were in every respect accountable to their member states. The classic example
 
of this system was the Achaean League (251–146 B.C.), a protofederal system
 
often erroneously considered to be the first federal polity (Freeman [1863] 1893). The
 
Greeks left some descriptions of their leagues but no theoretical discussions of the
 
league as a political system. Except for Aristotle’s criticisms, the great Greek political
 
theorists ignored federalism as a political principle because the very idea contradicted
 
their conception of the small, unified polis as the only basis upon which to build the
 
good regime.
 
  
Several of the great ancient empires, notably the Persian, Hellenic, and Roman Empires,
+
Several of the great ancient empires, notably the Persian, Hellenic, and Roman Empires, structured their political systems around the principle of cultural home rule. Since political life was virtually inseparable from the religious and cultural aspects of society in the ancient world, imperial recognition of local constitutions offered a measure of contractual devolution of political power; however, as in more recent examples of this form of imperialism, such home rule was not a matter of local right but represented a conditional grant subject to unilateral revocation by the imperial rulers.
structured their political systems around the principle of cultural home rule. Since
 
political life was virtually inseparable from the religious and cultural aspects of society
 
in the ancient world, imperial recognition of local constitutions offered a measure
 
of contractual devolution of political power; however, as in more recent examples of
 
this form of imperialism, such home rule was not a matter of local right but represented
 
a conditional grant subject to unilateral revocation by the imperial rulers.
 
  
 
==== Medieval Experiments ====
 
==== Medieval Experiments ====
Elements of the federal principle are foreshadowed in medieval feudalism through its
+
Elements of the federal principle are foreshadowed in medieval feudalism through its emphasis on essentially immutable contractual relationships that permanently link the contracting parties while guaranteeing their rights. However, the hierarchical character of these relationships, coupled with the lack of practical mechanisms to maintain the terms of the contracts, led to the degeneration of those elements in most feudal societies. Another movement in the direction of federalism grew out of the development of medieval commercial towns in central Europe that formed leagues for mutual defense and assistance following the Greek model. The most important development in this period was the first confederation of Swiss cantons in 1291 for mutual aid in defense of their independence. The success of this effort was in no small measure due to its connection, from the beginning, with quasi-popular government. These embryonic federal experiments all proceeded pragmatically while federal theory was confined to juridical discussions of the corporate relationships between polities in the Holy Roman Empire.
emphasis on essentially immutable contractual relationships that permanently link the
 
contracting parties while guaranteeing their rights. However, the hierarchical character
 
of these relationships, coupled with the lack of practical mechanisms to maintain the
 
terms of the contracts, led to the degeneration of those elements in most feudal societies.
 
Another movement in the direction of federalism grew out of the development of
 
medieval commercial towns in central Europe that formed leagues for mutual defense
 
and assistance following the Greek model. The most important development in this period
 
was the first confederation of Swiss cantons in 1291 for mutual aid in defense of
 
their independence. The success of this effort was in no small measure due to its connection,
 
from the beginning, with quasi-popular government. These embryonic federal
 
experiments all proceeded pragmatically while federal theory was confined to juridical
 
discussions of the corporate relationships between polities in the Holy Roman Empire.
 
  
Ultimately a fusion of contractual elements from feudalism with political mechanisms
+
Ultimately a fusion of contractual elements from feudalism with political mechanisms from the commercial confederacies gave rise to the immediate antecedents of modern federalism. The Christian states on the Iberian Peninsula created a political system that in its most advanced stages came very close to authentic federalism. During the years of the Spanish Reconquest, most of the peninsula was reorganized under the ''fuero'' system, which established local governments with relatively liberal political institutions in order to encourage resettlement. New states were formed through feudal-style contractual relationships designed to protect local rights. Three of these states joined in a quasi-federal arrangement under the Crown of Aragon, each of them (plus several in Italy added later) retaining its own constitution and governing institutions as well as acquiring representation in the overall Aragonese government. The unification of Spain under a multiple monarchy in 1469 left most of these federal elements intact for the next two and a half centuries, but the demands of the monarchy ultimately subverted them, transforming Spain into a precariously centralized state.
from the commercial confederacies gave rise to the immediate antecedents of
 
modern federalism. The Christian states on the Iberian Peninsula created a political
 
system that in its most advanced stages came very close to authentic federalism. During
 
the years of the Spanish Reconquest, most of the peninsula was reorganized under
 
the fuero system, which established local governments with relatively liberal political
 
institutions in order to encourage resettlement. New states were formed through feudalstyle
 
contractual relationships designed to protect local rights. Three of these states
 
joined in a quasi-federal arrangement under the Crown of Aragon, each of them (plus
 
several in Italy added later) retaining its own constitution and governing institutions as
 
well as acquiring representation in the overall Aragonese government. The unification
 
of Spain under a multiple monarchy in 1469 left most of these federal elements intact
 
for the next two and a half centuries, but the demands of the monarchy ultimately subverted
 
them, transforming Spain into a precariously centralized state.
 
  
In the sixteenth century, certain emergent civil societies, influenced by the Reformation
+
In the sixteenth century, certain emergent civil societies, influenced by the Reformation to return to Scripture as a political source, by the Spanish system of political organization, as well as by local necessity, began to apply federal principles for statebuilding purposes. The Hapsburg heirs to the Spanish crown had applied Iberian principles to the organization of their other European possessions. Their governmental reforms in the Netherlands provided an organizational basis for the federation of the United Provinces in the late sixteenth century. When that country gained its independence, it established a political system that, while unable to solve the most crucial technical problems of federalism, maintained itself in federal style for 200 years, until Napoleon put an end to its existence, leaving a residue of noncentralization that marks the Netherlands today.
to return to Scripture as a political source, by the Spanish system of political
 
organization, as well as by local necessity, began to apply federal principles for statebuilding
 
purposes. The Hapsburg heirs to the Spanish crown had applied Iberian principles
 
to the organization of their other European possessions. Their governmental
 
reforms in the Netherlands provided an organizational basis for the federation of the
 
United Provinces in the late sixteenth century. When that country gained its independence,
 
it established a political system that, while unable to solve the most crucial technical
 
problems of federalism, maintained itself in federal style for 200 years, until
 
Napoleon put an end to its existence, leaving a residue of noncentralization that marks
 
the Netherlands today.
 
  
The Swiss, in the meantime, were developing their own techniques for combining
+
The Swiss, in the meantime, were developing their own techniques for combining feudal and commercial elements to create a loose confederation of cantons, which was also influenced by biblical ideas and, perhaps negatively, by contacts with Hapsburg Spain. Achieving full independence in 1648, the Swiss confederation remained loosely leagued for two centuries (except for the Napoleonic interlude), until it adopted a federal constitution in 1848.
feudal and commercial elements to create a loose confederation of cantons, which was
 
also influenced by biblical ideas and, perhaps negatively, by contacts with Hapsburg
 
Spain. Achieving full independence in 1648, the Swiss confederation remained loosely
 
leagued for two centuries (except for the Napoleonic interlude), until it adopted a federal
 
constitution in 1848.
 
  
 
==== First Modern Formulations ====
 
==== First Modern Formulations ====
The protofederalism of the United Provinces and the Swiss cantons, coming at the outset
+
The protofederalism of the United Provinces and the Swiss cantons, coming at the outset of the age of nationalism, also stimulated the first serious efforts to formulate federal theories based on modern political ideas. Jean Bodin analyzed the possibilities of federation in light of the problem of sovereignty. Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf examined federal arrangements as aspects of international law. These theorists all treated federalism as an aspect of international law. Johannes Althusius (1603), analyzing the Dutch and Swiss constitutions, was the first to perceive that federalism was really concerned with problems of national unity. The real father of modern federal theory, he was also the first to connect federalism with popular sovereignty and to distinguish between leagues, multiple monarchies, and confederations. His retention of hierarchical principles and his emphasis on the corporate organization of society both flawed the federal character of his work and reflected the empirical roots of his analysis.
of the age of nationalism, also stimulated the first serious efforts to formulate federal
 
theories based on modern political ideas. Jean Bodin analyzed the possibilities of
 
federation in light of the problem of sovereignty. Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf
 
examined federal arrangements as aspects of international law. These theorists all
 
treated federalism as an aspect of international law. Johannes Althusius (1603), analyzing
 
the Dutch and Swiss constitutions, was the first to perceive that federalism was
 
really concerned with problems of national unity. The real father of modern federal
 
theory, he was also the first to connect federalism with popular sovereignty and to distinguish
 
between leagues, multiple monarchies, and confederations. His retention of
 
hierarchical principles and his emphasis on the corporate organization of society both
 
flawed the federal character of his work and reflected the empirical roots of his analysis.
 
  
Thus the rise of the nation-state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries stimulated
+
Thus the rise of the nation-state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries stimulated federal solutions to the problems of national unification. In all but a few countries on the periphery of western Europe, the application of federal principles foundered on three problems: (1) the conciliation of feudally rooted hierarchies with a system demanding fundamental social equality in order to facilitate the sharing of power, (2) the reconciliation of local autonomy with national energy in an era of political upheaval that required most nations to maintain a state of constant mobilization basically incompatible with the toleration of local differences, and (3) the problem of executive leadership and succession, which is particularly complex in federal systems and was not solved until the United States invented the elected presidency.
federal solutions to the problems of national unification. In all but a few countries on the periphery of western Europe, the application of federal principles foundered
 
on three problems: (1) the conciliation of feudally rooted hierarchies with a system demanding
 
fundamental social equality in order to facilitate the sharing of power, (2) the
 
reconciliation of local autonomy with national energy in an era of political upheaval
 
that required most nations to maintain a state of constant mobilization basically incompatible
 
with the toleration of local differences, and (3) the problem of executive
 
leadership and succession, which is particularly complex in federal systems and was
 
not solved until the United States invented the elected presidency.
 
  
 
==== Modern Federalism ====
 
==== Modern Federalism ====
The rise of modern imperialism also contributed to the emergence of federalism, as indicated
+
The rise of modern imperialism also contributed to the emergence of federalism, as indicated by the works of the important prerevolutionary political theorists of the eighteenth century, for example, Montesquieu and Adam Smith. Here, too, the Spanish experience was influential, but it remained for the British to create the requisite popular institutions in their colonization of North America and for the biblically influenced colonists to create the theoretical justification for these institutions. The theoretical ambiguity of those quasi-federal institutions led Americans to assume that their relationship to the British government was federal, while London entertained no such notion (Becker [1922] 1958). The Americans’ response to their view of the imperial system helped them develop the federal ideas they were later to use so creatively.
by the works of the important prerevolutionary political theorists of the eighteenth
 
century, for example, Montesquieu and Adam Smith. Here, too, the Spanish
 
experience was influential, but it remained for the British to create the requisite popular
 
institutions in their colonization of North America and for the biblically influenced
 
colonists to create the theoretical justification for these institutions. The theoretical ambiguity
 
of those quasi-federal institutions led Americans to assume that their relationship
 
to the British government was federal, while London entertained no such notion
 
(Becker [1922] 1958). The Americans’ response to their view of the imperial system
 
helped them develop the federal ideas they were later to use so creatively.
 
  
The founders of the United States of America can be said to have transformed and
+
The founders of the United States of America can be said to have transformed and organized the principles of federalism into a practical system of government. They were able to do so partly because their nation developed without the disadvantages that plagued earlier federal systems. As a postfeudal society, the United States had no serious problem of coping with hierarchies. As a relatively isolated nation, external pressures for centralization were not present for nearly 150 years. American political inventiveness took care of the internal problems of applying the federal principle, though not without having to fight a major civil war to resolve some of them. Though the specific forms of American federalism were not widely imitated with success, its basic principles of organization were emulated by almost every other nation attempting the federal solution to the problems of popular government in a pluralistic civil society. The creation of the theoretical framework for those principles was part and parcel of the invention of federalism. Set forth in its basics in the debate over ratification of the U.S. Constitution, that framework had at its core ''The Federalist'' (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay [1787–88] 1961), the classic formulation of the principles of modern federalism. Equally important to the evolution of federal systems, however, were the arguments of those who wished to preserve even greater state autonomy; many of these arguments were transformed into tools to promote extraconstitutional decentralization during the nineteenth century.
organized the principles of federalism into a practical system of government. They were
 
able to do so partly because their nation developed without the disadvantages that
 
plagued earlier federal systems. As a postfeudal society, the United States had no serious
 
problem of coping with hierarchies. As a relatively isolated nation, external pressures
 
for centralization were not present for nearly 150 years. American political
 
inventiveness took care of the internal problems of applying the federal principle,
 
though not without having to fight a major civil war to resolve some of them. Though
 
the specific forms of American federalism were not widely imitated with success, its
 
basic principles of organization were emulated by almost every other nation attempting
 
the federal solution to the problems of popular government in a pluralistic civil society.
 
The creation of the theoretical framework for those principles was part and parcel
 
of the invention of federalism. Set forth in its basics in the debate over ratification of
 
the U.S. Constitution, that framework had at its core The Federalist (Hamilton, Madison,
 
and Jay [1787–88] 1961), the classic formulation of the principles of modern federalism.
 
Equally important to the evolution of federal systems, however, were the
 
arguments of those who wished to preserve even greater state autonomy; many of these
 
arguments were transformed into tools to promote extraconstitutional decentralization
 
during the nineteenth century.
 
  
From the first, American contributions to federal theory—even those of the few theorists
+
From the first, American contributions to federal theory—even those of the few theorists not actively involved in politics—have been rooted in the practical concerns of maintaining a federal system. Most of these contributions have, accordingly, been formulated as discussions of constitutional law. The courts, particularly the federal Supreme Court, have conducted continuing debate on the meaning and character of federalism through the medium of case law. Leading political figures, such as Albert Gallatin, [[Calhoun, John C.|John Calhoun]], [[Lincoln, Abraham|Abraham Lincoln]], [[Wilson, Woodrow|Woodrow Wilson]], and [[Roosevelt, Theodore|Theodore]] and [[Roosevelt, Franklin D.|Franklin D. Roosevelt]], have made real contributions through their state papers. The pragmatic orientation of those contributions, however, has tended to obscure their more lasting theoretical importance (Anderson 1955).
not actively involved in politics—have been rooted in the practical concerns of
 
maintaining a federal system. Most of these contributions have, accordingly, been formulated
 
as discussions of constitutional law. The courts, particularly the federal
 
Supreme Court, have conducted continuing debate on the meaning and character of
 
federalism through the medium of case law. Leading political figures, such as Albert
 
Gallatin, John Calhoun, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Theodore and
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, have made real contributions through their state papers. The
 
pragmatic orientation of those contributions, however, has tended to obscure their more
 
lasting theoretical importance (Anderson 1955).
 
  
The French Revolution, while stimulating the development of popular government,
+
The French Revolution, while stimulating the development of popular government, was essentially hostile to the spirit and institutions of federalism. Its immediate heirs tried to destroy federal institutions in western Europe in the name of democracy, and the subsequent bearers of its tradition have proved equally hostile to federal ideas—except insofar as some of them have equated federalism with decentralized government.
was essentially hostile to the spirit and institutions of federalism. Its immediate heirs
 
tried to destroy federal institutions in western Europe in the name of democracy, and
 
the subsequent bearers of its tradition have proved equally hostile to federal ideas—except
 
insofar as some of them have equated federalism with decentralized government.
 
  
In the nineteenth century, several of the new Latin American nations, following the
+
In the nineteenth century, several of the new Latin American nations, following the United States’ example and also influenced by the federal elements in the Hispanic imperial tradition, experimented with federalism, with distinctly mixed results. Even where federalism survived in theory, the instability of Latin American governments and the frequent recourse to dictatorial regimes hampered its effective operation. Even so, the three largest Latin American nations—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—retain federal systems of varying political significance; federal principles are also included in the political systems of Colombia and Venezuela.
United States’ example and also influenced by the federal elements in the Hispanic imperial
 
tradition, experimented with federalism, with distinctly mixed results. Even
 
where federalism survived in theory, the instability of Latin American governments and
 
the frequent recourse to dictatorial regimes hampered its effective operation. Even so,
 
the three largest Latin American nations—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—retain federal
 
systems of varying political significance; federal principles are also included in
 
the political systems of Colombia and Venezuela.
 
  
In the mid-nineteenth century, European politicians and political theorists, stimulated
+
In the mid-nineteenth century, European politicians and political theorists, stimulated by necessity, the American example, and the very influential studies of Tocqueville ([1835] 1945), turned to consider federalism as a form of democratic political organization. Though practical applications remained few, numerous works were produced, primarily in the German-speaking countries, where doctrinaire and metaphysical analyses of federalism in relation to the problems of nationalism, sovereignty, and popular consent were in vogue. The most important of these works were the theoretical formulations of Bluntschli (1849–52), based on his observations of federal reorganization in Switzerland, and the historical studies of Gierke ([1913] 1934). In the end, federal principles were used in the unification of Germany, and Switzerland adopted a modern federal constitution. Fully federal solutions were rejected in other nations, but several
by necessity, the American example, and the very influential studies of Tocqueville
+
adopted quasi-federal institutions to meet particular problems of unification and decentralization.
([1835] 1945), turned to consider federalism as a form of democratic political organization.
 
Though practical applications remained few, numerous works were produced,
 
primarily in the German-speaking countries, where doctrinaire and metaphysical analyses
 
of federalism in relation to the problems of nationalism, sovereignty, and popular
 
consent were in vogue. The most important of these works were the theoretical formulations
 
of Bluntschli (1849–52), based on his observations of federal reorganization
 
in Switzerland, and the historical studies of Gierke ([1913] 1934). In the end, federal
 
principles were used in the unification of Germany, and Switzerland adopted a modern
 
federal constitution. Fully federal solutions were rejected in other nations, but several
 
adopted quasi-federal institutions to meet particular problems of unification and
 
decentralization.
 
  
During the late nineteenth century, British interest in imperial federalism was manifested
+
During the late nineteenth century, British interest in imperial federalism was manifested in several ways. Canada and Australia were given federal constitutions and dominion status in 1867 and 1901, respectively, and the foundations were laid for the federal unification of India. British political theorists interested in imperial unity and internal devolution explored contemporary (Bryce [1888] 1909) and historical (Freeman [1863] 1893) federal experiments and presented arguments of their own as to the utility and proper organization of federal systems (Labilliere 1894).
in several ways. Canada and Australia were given federal constitutions and dominion
 
status in 1867 and 1901, respectively, and the foundations were laid for the
 
federal unification of India. British political theorists interested in imperial unity and
 
internal devolution explored contemporary (Bryce [1888] 1909) and historical (Freeman
 
[1863] 1893) federal experiments and presented arguments of their own as to the
 
utility and proper organization of federal systems (Labilliere 1894).
 
  
Whereas in the nineteenth century federalism was used to abet ethnic nationalism,
+
Whereas in the nineteenth century federalism was used to abet ethnic nationalism, in the twentieth it has been used as a means to unify multiethnic nations. Several of the ethnically heterogeneous nations created or reconstructed after World War I, including the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, formally embraced federalism as a nominal solution to their nationality problems. The United Kingdom added a federal dimension at the same time to accommodate the Irish. The extension of nation-building activities to Asia and Africa, where ethnic diversity is even greater than in Europe, has led to new efforts in the same vein. In nations outside of the totalitarian orbit, such as India and Malaysia, federalism has been used to secure political and cultural rights for the larger ethnolinguistic groups. In Africa, where the survival of separate ethnic groups has been called into question by the native nationalists, federalism has been applied in several nations, including Nigeria and Cameroon, as a device for sharing political power rather than a way to maintain cultural autonomy.
in the twentieth it has been used as a means to unify multiethnic nations. Several of
 
the ethnically heterogeneous nations created or reconstructed after World War I, including
 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, formally embraced federalism as a nominal
 
solution to their nationality problems. The United Kingdom added a federal dimension
 
at the same time to accommodate the Irish. The extension of nation-building activities
 
to Asia and Africa, where ethnic diversity is even greater than in Europe, has led to
 
new efforts in the same vein. In nations outside of the totalitarian orbit, such as India
 
and Malaysia, federalism has been used to secure political and cultural rights for the
 
larger ethnolinguistic groups. In Africa, where the survival of separate ethnic groups
 
has been called into question by the native nationalists, federalism has been applied in
 
several nations, including Nigeria and Cameroon, as a device for sharing political power
 
rather than a way to maintain cultural autonomy.
 
  
 
==== The Contemporary Study of Federalism ====
 
==== The Contemporary Study of Federalism ====
The emergence of political science as a discipline in the late nineteenth century stimulated
+
The emergence of political science as a discipline in the late nineteenth century stimulated a shift from an explicitly normative to a predominantly empirical interest in federalism. Such noted British scholars as Bryce (1901) and Dicey ([1885] 1961) were the first to study federalism as part of their general interest in political systems. American scholars began their work in the 1870s, as the Civil War generation was passing into history, but their first works still reflected the issues of the war. Thus Burgess (1886) concluded that the utility of the states was dissipated by modern technology just as their power was destroyed by the war, while Wilson ([1885] 1961) accepted the view that the war had wrought great changes but still saw federalism as alive and vital.
a shift from an explicitly normative to a predominantly empirical interest in federalism.
 
Such noted British scholars as Bryce (1901) and Dicey ([1885] 1961) were
 
the first to study federalism as part of their general interest in political systems. American
 
scholars began their work in the 1870s, as the Civil War generation was passing
 
into history, but their first works still reflected the issues of the war. Thus Burgess
 
(1886) concluded that the utility of the states was dissipated by modern technology just
 
as their power was destroyed by the war, while Wilson ([1885] 1961) accepted the view
 
that the war had wrought great changes but still saw federalism as alive and vital.
 
  
Though these men and their colleagues laid the foundations for the empirical study
+
Though these men and their colleagues laid the foundations for the empirical study of federal systems with the tools of contemporary political science, federalism as a field of study was neglected for many years. The rise of other problems to attract the attention of scholars, the negation of earlier legalistic and metaphysical approaches, and the decline of normative interest in the federal principle combined to dissuade younger political scientists from examining questions of federal government, except incidentally, until the twentieth century was well advanced.
of federal systems with the tools of contemporary political science, federalism as a
 
field of study was neglected for many years. The rise of other problems to attract the
 
attention of scholars, the negation of earlier legalistic and metaphysical approaches,
 
and the decline of normative interest in the federal principle combined to dissuade
 
younger political scientists from examining questions of federal government, except
 
incidentally, until the twentieth century was well advanced.
 
  
Renewed interest in the field first developed when American students of public administration
+
Renewed interest in the field first developed when American students of public administration found themselves confronted with problems of intergovernmental relations at nearly every turn. The study of intergovernmental relations in the administrative realm brought about significant gains in the understanding of the process of federal government, not the least of which was a growing recognition that the assumptions about federalism underlying their work, borrowed whole from nineteenth-century theorists, needed serious reexamination. Beginning in the 1930's and 1940's, American and British political scientists began to raise fundamental questions about the nature of federal systems and the interrelationships of their governmental components (Anderson 1946). In the 1950's these questions were expanded to include, among others, problems of political influence, the role of political parties, the historical development of federal systems, and the meaning of earlier federal theories (Bachelder and Shaw 1964). By the early 1960's, students of existing federal governments were rediscovering the need to clarify the principles of federalism in order to understand the operation of those governments. Students of comparative government were also becoming increasingly interested in problems of political integration, centralization, and decentralization—all of which stimulated new interest in the systematic study of federalism.
found themselves confronted with problems of intergovernmental relations
 
at nearly every turn. The study of intergovernmental relations in the administrative
 
realm brought about significant gains in the understanding of the process of federal
 
government, not the least of which was a growing recognition that the assumptions
 
about federalism underlying their work, borrowed whole from nineteenth-century theorists,
 
needed serious reexamination. Beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, American and
 
British political scientists began to raise fundamental questions about the nature of federal
 
systems and the interrelationships of their governmental components (Anderson
 
1946). In the 1950s these questions were expanded to include, among others, problems
 
of political influence, the role of political parties, the historical development of federal
 
systems, and the meaning of earlier federal theories (Bachelder and Shaw 1964). By
 
the early 1960s, students of existing federal governments were rediscovering the need
 
to clarify the principles of federalism in order to understand the operation of those governments.
 
Students of comparative government were also becoming increasingly interested
 
in problems of political integration, centralization, and decentralization—all
 
of which stimulated new interest in the systematic study of federalism.
 
  
 
=== EVALUATION ===
 
=== EVALUATION ===
While many attempts to establish federal systems have ended in failure, such systems,
+
While many attempts to establish federal systems have ended in failure, such systems, once established, have proved to be most durable. No authentic federal system that has lasted for even fifteen years has ever been abandoned except through revolutionary disruption (as in the case of Germany), and in every such case federalism—showing remarkable resilience—has ultimately been restored. Certain theories to the contrary, there is no evidence that federalism represents a transitional stage on the road to unitary government. No federal system in history has ever “evolved” into a unitary one, nor has any established system been structurally consolidated by internal decision. On the contrary, federal devices to conciliate minority populations have been used in place of force to maintain unity even in consolidated systems. Moreover, federal systems or systems strongly influenced by the federal principle have been among the most stable and long lasting of polities.
once established, have proved to be most durable. No authentic federal system that has
 
lasted for even fifteen years has ever been abandoned except through revolutionary disruption
 
(as in the case of Germany), and in every such case federalism—showing remarkable
 
resilience—has ultimately been restored. Certain theories to the contrary,
 
there is no evidence that federalism represents a transitional stage on the road to unitary
 
government. No federal system in history has ever “evolved” into a unitary one,
 
nor has any established system been structurally consolidated by internal decision. On
 
the contrary, federal devices to conciliate minority populations have been used in place
 
of force to maintain unity even in consolidated systems. Moreover, federal systems or
 
systems strongly influenced by the federal principle have been among the most stable
 
and long lasting of polities.
 
  
At the same time, relatively few cultures have been able to utilize federal principles in
+
At the same time, relatively few cultures have been able to utilize federal principles in government. Anglo-American civil societies have done so most successfully. Even those not fully committed to federalism have, without exception, included elements of the federal principle in whatever systems they have chosen, no doubt because both constitutionalism and noncentralization rate high on the scale of Anglo-American political values.
government. Anglo-American civil societies have done so most successfully. Even those
 
not fully committed to federalism have, without exception, included elements of the federal
 
principle in whatever systems they have chosen, no doubt because both constitutionalism
 
and noncentralization rate high on the scale of Anglo-American political values.
 
  
Of the sixteen formally federal nations that exist in the world today, Australia,
+
Of the sixteen formally federal nations that exist in the world today, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, and the United States were created under British colonial tutelage. These seven include all the nations established since World War II that have been able to maintain federal systems, and they provide most of the successful examples of federalism in operation. Of the nine remaining federal nations, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico fall directly within the Hispanic political tradition, and Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, though they follow the Germanic political tradition, were also influenced by Hispanic ideas at some point in their development. Both political traditions have been influential in stimulating federal inclinations in many of the nonfederal nations, but they have been notably less successful in fostering lasting federal institutions; the Hispanic tradition has failed to combine federalism and stability, while the Germanic has tended toward authoritarian centralization. (The three remaining nations, Libya, the former Soviet Union, and former Yugoslavia, are federal in name and formal structure but hardly in any meaningful sense of the term.)
Cameroon, Canada, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, and the United States were created under
 
British colonial tutelage. These seven include all the nations established since World
 
War II that have been able to maintain federal systems, and they provide most of the
 
successful examples of federalism in operation. Of the nine remaining federal nations,
 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico fall directly within the Hispanic political tradition, and
 
Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, though they follow the Germanic political tradition,
 
were also influenced by Hispanic ideas at some point in their development. Both
 
political traditions have been influential in stimulating federal inclinations in many of
 
the nonfederal nations, but they have been notably less successful in fostering lasting
 
federal institutions; the Hispanic tradition has failed to combine federalism and stability,
 
while the Germanic has tended toward authoritarian centralization. (The three remaining
 
nations, Libya, the former Soviet Union, and former Yugoslavia, are federal
 
in name and formal structure but hardly in any meaningful sense of the term.)
 
  
The successful operation of federal systems requires a particular kind of political environment,
+
The successful operation of federal systems requires a particular kind of political environment, one that is conducive to popular government and has the strong traditions of political cooperation and self-restraint that are needed to maintain a system that minimizes the use of coercion. Beyond the level of tradition, federal systems operate best in societies with sufficient homogeneity of fundamental interests—or consensus—to allow a great deal of latitude in political operations and to place primary reliance upon voluntary collaboration. The existence of severe strains on the body politic that lead to the use of force to maintain domestic order is even more inimical to the successful maintenance of federal patterns of government than of other forms of popular government. Moreover, federal systems are most successful in civil societies with the human resources to fill many public offices competently and with material resources plentiful enough to allow a measure of economic waste in payment for the luxury of liberty.  
one that is conducive to popular government and has the strong traditions
 
of political cooperation and self-restraint that are needed to maintain a system that minimizes
 
the use of coercion. Beyond the level of tradition, federal systems operate best
 
in societies with sufficient homogeneity of fundamental interests—or consensus—to
 
allow a great deal of latitude in political operations and to place primary reliance upon
 
voluntary collaboration. The existence of severe strains on the body politic that lead to
 
the use of force to maintain domestic order is even more inimical to the successful maintenance
 
of federal patterns of government than of other forms of popular government.
 
Moreover, federal systems are most successful in civil societies with the human resources
 
to fill many public offices competently and with material resources plentiful
 
enough to allow a measure of economic waste in payment for the luxury of liberty.  
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY: Johannes Althusius, Politica methodice digesta, ed. Carl J. Friedrich
+
{| class="wikitable"
(1603; reprint, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932); American Academy of
+
|-
Political and Social Science, Intergovernmental Relations in the United States, Annals,
+
| '''BIBLIOGRAPHY:'''
vol. 359, ed. Harry W. Reynolds Jr. (Philadelphia: AAPSS, 1965); William Anderson,
+
Johannes Althusius, ''Politica methodice digesta'', ed. Carl J. Friedrich (1603; reprint, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932); American Academy of Political and Social Science, ''Intergovernmental Relations in the United States'', Annals, vol. 359, ed. Harry W. Reynolds Jr. (Philadelphia: AAPSS, 1965); William Anderson, ''Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations: A Budget of Suggestions for Research'' (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1946); William Anderson, ''The Nation and the States: Rivals or Partners?'' (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955); Vernon V. Aspaturian, “The Theory and Practice of Soviet Federalism,” ''Journal of Politics'' 12 (1950): 20–51; Glen L. Bachelder and Paul C. Shaw, “Federalism: A Selected Bibliography” (Michigan State University, Institute for Community Development and Services, 1964); Carl L. Becker, ''The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas'' (1922; reprint, New York: Vintage, 1958); Anthony H. Birch, ''Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation in Canada, Australia, and the United States'' (Oxford: Clarendon, 1955); Johann K. Bluntschli, ''Geschichte des schweizerischen Bundesrechtes'', 2 vols. (Zurich: Meyer & Zeller, 1849–52); Max H. Boehm, “Federalism,” in ''Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences'', vol. 6, 169–72 (New York: Macmillan, 1931); Joan Bondurant, ''Regionalism vs. Provincialism: A Study in Problems of Indian National Unity'', India Press Digests Monograph Series, no. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958); Lionel Brett, ed., ''Constitutional Problems of Federalism in Nigeria'' (Lagos, Nigeria: Times Press, 1961); John Bright, ''A History of Israel'' (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959); James Bryce, ''The American Commonwealth'', 3rd ed., 2 vols. (1888; reprint, New York and London: Macmillan, 1909); James Bryce, ''Studies in History and Jurisprudence'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1901); John W. Burgess, “The American Commonwealth,” ''Political Science Quarterly'' 1 (1886): 9–35; Canada, Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, ''Report'', 3 vols. (Ottawa: Patenaud, 1940), vol. 1: ''Canada: 1867–1939'', vol. 2: ''Recommendations'', vol. 3: ''Documentation''; Claremont Men’s College, Institute for Studies in Federalism, ''Essays in Federalism'', ed. George C. S. Benson et al. (Claremont, CA: Claremont Men’s College, 1961); George A. Codding, ''The Federal Government of Switzerland'' (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961); Zehman Cowen, ''Federal Jurisdiction in Australia'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); Martin Diamond, ''“The Federalist,” in History of Political Philosophy'', ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, 573–93 (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Albert V. Dicey, ''Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution'', 10th ed., intro. by E.C.S. Wade (1885; reprint, London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s, 1961); Daniel J. Elazar, ''The American Partnership: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Nineteenth-Century United States'' (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Daniel J. Elazar, ''American Federalism: A View from the States'' (New York: Crowell, 1966); John H. Elliott, ''Imperial Spain: 1469–1716'' (New York: St. Martin’s, 1964); Edward A. Freeman, ''The History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy'', 2nd ed. (1863; reprint, London: Macmillan, 1893); Otto von Gierke, ''Natural Law and the Theory of Society: 1500 to 1800'' trans. with intro. by Ernst Barker (1913; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934); Robert A. Goldwin, ed., ''A Nation of States: Essays on the American Federal System'' (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); W. Brooke Graves, ''American Intergovernmental Relations: Their Origins, Historical Development, and Current Status'' (New York: Scribner, 1964); Morton Grodzins, “American Political Parties and the American System,” ''Western Political Quarterly'' 13 (1960a): 974–98; Morton Grodzins, “The Federal System,” in ''U.S. President’s Commission on National Goals, Goals for Americans'', 265–82 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960b); Morton Grodzins, ''The American System: A New View of Government in the United States'' (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, ''The Federalist'', ed. with intro. and notes by Jacob E. Cooke (1787–88; reprint, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961); Ursula K. Hicks et al., ''Federalism and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries: A Symposium'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961); Yerezxel Kaufmann, ''The Religion of Israel: From Its Beginnings to the Babylonian Exile'' (1937–48; reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Francis P. de Labilliere, ''Federal Britain: Or, Unity and Federation of the Empire'' (London: Low, Marston, 1894); William S. Livingston, ed., ''Federalism in the Commonwealth: A Bibliographical Commentary'' (London: Cassell, 1963); Arthur Maass, ed. ''Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government'' (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959); Arthur W. Macmahon, ed., ''Federalism: Mature and Emergent'' (1955; reprint, New York: Russell, 1962); Jackson T. Main, ''The Anti-Federalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781–1788'' (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Perry Miller, ''The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century'' (1939; reprint, Boston: Beacon, 1961); David Milne, ''The Scottish Office and Other Scottish Government Departments'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957); Ssobei Mogi, ''The Problem of Federalism: A Study in the History of Political Theory'', 2 vols. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1931); William A. Riker, ''Federalism. Origin, Operation, Significance'' (Boston: Little, 1964); John R. Schmidhauser, ''The Supreme Court as Final Arbiter in Federal-State Relations: 1789–1957'' (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958); Beij M. Sharma, ''Federalism in Theory and Practice'', 2 vols. (Chandausi, India: Bhargava, 1953); Donald V. Smiley, “The Rowell-Sirois Report, Provincial Autonomy, and Post-War Canadian Federalism,” ''Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science'' 28 (1962): 54–69; Donald V. Smiley, “The Two Themes of Canadian Federalism,” ''Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science'' 31 (1965): 80–97; Alexis de Tocqueville, ''Democracy in America'', 2 vols. (1835; reprint, New York: Knopf, 1945); U.S. Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, ''A Report to the President for Transmittal to the Congress'' (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1955); U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, ''Intergovernmental Relations in the United States: A Selected Bibliography'' (1955; reprint, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1956); Roger H. Wells, ''The States in West German Federalism: A Study of Federal-State Relations, 1949–1960'' (New York: Bookman, 1961); Kenneth C. Wheare, ''Federal Government'', 4th ed. (1946; reprint, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); and Woodrow Wilson, ''Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics'' (1885; reprint, New York: Meridian, 1961).
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations: A Budget of Suggestions for Research (Chicago:
+
|}
Public Administration Service, 1946); William Anderson, The Nation and the States:
+
 
Rivals or Partners? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955); Vernon V. Aspaturian,
+
This essay is reprinted from David L. Sills (ed.), ''The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences'' (New York: Macmillan, 1972). Reprinted by permission of the Gale Group.
“The Theory and Practice of Soviet Federalism,” Journal of Politics 12 (1950):
 
20–51; Glen L. Bachelder and Paul C. Shaw, “Federalism: A Selected Bibliography”
 
(Michigan State University, Institute for Community Development and Services, 1964);
 
This essay is reprinted from David L. Sills (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New
 
York: Macmillan, 1972). Reprinted by permission of the Gale Group.
 
Federalism
 
241
 
Carl L. Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas
 
(1922; reprint, New York: Vintage, 1958); Anthony H. Birch, Federalism, Finance and Social
 
Legislation in Canada, Australia, and the United States (Oxford: Clarendon, 1955);
 
Johann K. Bluntschli, Geschichte des schweizerischen Bundesrechtes, 2 vols. (Zurich:
 
Meyer & Zeller, 1849–52); Max H. Boehm, “Federalism,” in Encyclopedia of the Social
 
Sciences, vol. 6, 169–72 (New York: Macmillan, 1931); Joan Bondurant, Regionalism vs.
 
Provincialism: A Study in Problems of Indian National Unity, India Press Digests Monograph
 
Series, no. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958); Lionel Brett, ed.,
 
Constitutional Problems of Federalism in Nigeria (Lagos, Nigeria: Times Press, 1961);
 
John Bright, A History of Israel (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959); James Bryce,
 
The American Commonwealth, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (1888; reprint, New York and London:
 
Macmillan, 1909); James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford
 
University Press, 1901); John W. Burgess, “The American Commonwealth,” Political
 
Science Quarterly 1 (1886): 9–35; Canada, Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial
 
Relations, Report, 3 vols. (Ottawa: Patenaud, 1940), vol. 1: Canada: 1867–1939, vol. 2:
 
Recommendations, vol. 3: Documentation; Claremont Men’s College, Institute for Studies
 
in Federalism, Essays in Federalism, ed. George C. S. Benson et al. (Claremont, CA:
 
Claremont Men’s College, 1961); George A. Codding, The Federal Government of
 
Switzerland (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961); Zehman Cowen, Federal Jurisdiction in
 
Australia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); Martin Diamond, “The Federalist,”
 
in History of Political Philosophy, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, 573–93 (Chicago:
 
Rand McNally, 1963); Albert V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution,
 
10th ed., intro. by E.C.S. Wade (1885; reprint, London: Macmillan; New York:
 
St. Martin’s, 1961); Daniel J. Elazar, The American Partnership: Intergovernmental Cooperation
 
in the Nineteenth-Century United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
 
1962); Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Crowell,
 
1966); John H. Elliott, Imperial Spain: 1469–1716 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1964);
 
Edward A. Freeman, The History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy, 2nd ed.
 
(1863; reprint, London: Macmillan, 1893); Otto von Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory
 
of Society: 1500 to 1800 trans. with intro. by Ernst Barker (1913; reprint, Cambridge:
 
Cambridge University Press, 1934); Robert A. Goldwin, ed., A Nation of States: Essays
 
on the American Federal System (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); W. Brooke Graves,
 
American Intergovernmental Relations: Their Origins, Historical Development, and Current
 
Status (New York: Scribner, 1964); Morton Grodzins, “American Political Parties and
 
the American System,” Western Political Quarterly 13 (1960a): 974–98; Morton Grodzins,
 
“The Federal System,” in U.S. President’s Commission on National Goals, Goals for Americans,
 
265–82 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960b); Morton Grodzins, The American
 
System: A New View of Government in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally,
 
1966); Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist, ed. with intro.
 
and notes by Jacob E. Cooke (1787–88; reprint, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University
 
Press, 1961); Ursula K. Hicks et al., Federalism and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped
 
Countries: A Symposium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961); Yerezxel Kaufmann,
 
The Religion of Israel: From Its Beginnings to the Babylonian Exile (1937–48;
 
reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Francis P. de Labilliere, Federal
 
Britain: Or, Unity and Federation of the Empire (London: Low, Marston, 1894); William
 
S. Livingston, ed., Federalism in the Commonwealth: A Bibliographical Commentary
 
(London: Cassell, 1963); Arthur Maass, ed. Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government
 
(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959); Arthur W. Macmahon, ed., Federalism: Mature and
 
Federalism Summit
 
242
 
Emergent (1955; reprint, New York: Russell, 1962); Jackson T. Main, The Anti-Federalists:
 
Critics of the Constitution, 1781–1788 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
 
1961); Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (1939; reprint,
 
Boston: Beacon, 1961); David Milne, The Scottish Office and Other Scottish Government
 
Departments (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957); Ssobei Mogi, The Problem of
 
Federalism: A Study in the History of Political Theory, 2 vols. (London: Allen & Unwin,
 
1931); William A. Riker, Federalism. Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little,
 
1964); John R. Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court as Final Arbiter in Federal-State Relations:
 
1789–1957 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958); Beij M. Sharma,
 
Federalism in Theory and Practice, 2 vols. (Chandausi, India: Bhargava, 1953); Donald V.
 
Smiley, “The Rowell-Sirois Report, Provincial Autonomy, and Post-War Canadian Federalism,”
 
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 28 (1962): 54–69; Donald
 
V. Smiley, “The Two Themes of Canadian Federalism,” Canadian Journal of Economics
 
and Political Science 31 (1965): 80–97; Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 2
 
vols. (1835; reprint, New York: Knopf, 1945); U.S. Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
 
A Report to the President for Transmittal to the Congress (Washington, DC: Government
 
Printing Office, 1955); U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government
 
Operations, Intergovernmental Relations in the United States: A Selected Bibliography
 
(1955; reprint, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1956); Roger H. Wells, The
 
States in West German Federalism: A Study of Federal-State Relations, 1949–1960 (New
 
York: Bookman, 1961); Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. (1946; reprint,
 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); and Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government:
 
A Study in American Politics (1885; reprint, New York: Meridian, 1961).
 
  
 
==== Daniel J. Elazar ====
 
==== Daniel J. Elazar ====
 +
 +
Last updated: 2006
  
 
SEE ALSO: [[Federal-State Relations]]; [[Intergovernmental Relations]]; [[U.S. Constitution]]
 
SEE ALSO: [[Federal-State Relations]]; [[Intergovernmental Relations]]; [[U.S. Constitution]]

Latest revision as of 05:54, 13 September 2018

Federalism and its kindred terms (e.g., “federal”) are used, most broadly, to describe the mode of political organization that unites separate polities into an overarching political system so as to allow each to maintain its fundamental political integrity. Federal systems do this by distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of all the governments. By requiring that basic policies be made and implemented through negotiation in some form, it enables all to share the system’s decision making and decision-making processes.

DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS

No single definition of federalism has proved satisfactory to all students, primarily because of the difficulties in relating theoretical formulations to the evidence gathered from observing the actual operation of federal systems. Attempts at definition have also foundered on the problems of distinguishing between (1) the federal principle as a broad social concept and federalism as a narrower political device, (2) two classic but different conceptions of federalism, (3) authentically federal systems and political systems that utilize elements of the federal principle, (4) mature and emergent federal systems, and (5) federalism and “intergovernmental relations” as distinct political phenomena.

Social and Political Principle

Federalism, conceived in the broadest social sense, looks to the linkage of people and institutions by mutual consent, without the sacrifice of their individual identities, as the ideal form of social organization. First formulated in the covenant theories of the Bible (Kaufman 1937–48), this conception of federalism was revived by the Bible-centered “federal” theologians of seventeenth-century Britain and New England (Miller [1939] 1961), who coined the term “federal”—derived from the Latin foedus (covenant)—in 1645 to describe the system of holy and enduring covenants between God and man that lay the foundation of their worldview. This conception of federalism was given new theoretical form by nineteenth-century French and German social theorists. Closely related to the various theories of social contract, it is characterized by the desire to build society on the basis of coordinative rather than subordinative relationships and by the emphasis on partnership among parties with equal claims to legitimacy who seek to cultivate their diverse integrities within a common social order (Boehm 1931).

As a political device, federalism can be viewed more narrowly as a kind of political order animated by political principles that emphasize the primacy of bargaining and negotiated coordination among several power centers as a prelude to the exercise of power within a single political system, and that stress the value of dispersed power centers as a means for safeguarding individual and local liberties. This means, in effect, that political institutions common to different political systems, when combined within a federal system and animated by federal principles, are effectively endowed with a distinctive character. For example, while political parties are common in modern political systems, parties animated by the federal principle show unique characteristics of fragmentation and a lack of central discipline that increase the power of local groups within the system as a whole (Grodzins 1960a).

Federation and Confederation

Federal ideas have been systematically conceptualized in two different ways. On the one hand, federalism has been conceived as a means to unite a people already linked by bonds of nationality through the distribution of political power among the nation’s constituent units. In such cases, the polities that constitute the federal system are unalterably parts of the national whole, and federalism invariably leads to the development of a strong national government operating in direct contact with the people it serves, just as the constituent governments do. On the other hand, federalism has also been conceived as a means to unify diverse peoples for important but limited purposes, without disrupting their primary ties to the individual polities that constitute the federal system. In such cases the federal government is generally limited in its scope and powers, functioning through constituent governments that retain their plenary autonomy, and to a substantial degree is dependent upon them.

Both conceptions of federalism have evolved from early federal experiments. The principles of strong national federalism were first applied by the ancient Israelites, beginning in the thirteenth century B.C., to maintain their national unity through linking their several tribes under a single national constitution and at least quasi-federal political institutions (Bright 1959). Several centuries later, the Greek city-states experimented with federal-style institutions as means for the promotion of intranational harmony and cooperation, primarily for defensive purposes, through associations (e.g., the Achaean League) that came close to what were later defined as confederations (Freeman [1863] 1893). A modified form of the Greek view was developed by the sixteenth-century theorists (Gierke [1913] 1934). They held that federalism meant a permanent league of states united through a perpetual covenant, binding under international law, in which the constituent states delegated enumerated powers to a general government while retaining full rights of internal sovereignty.

However, when the American system—the prototype of modern federal systems—emerged in the late eighteenth century, its architects developed a conception of federalism much like that of ancient Israel. From the first, American federalism functioned to serve a people with a single national identity and was constituted with a strong national government to serve that people on a national basis, though, as late as 1789, The Federalist could describe the new American Constitution as “partly national and partly federal” in deference to the then-accepted views. The successful efforts of the supporters of the Constitution to appropriate the term “federalist” for their own use (Main 1961, ix–xi) restored to common usage the older conception of federalism as a noncentralized national union bound by municipal law, with a general government superior to the governments of the constituent states (Diamond 1963).

Just as the American system became the prototype for other modern federal systems, so the American conception of federalism became the generally accepted one. The other conception was ultimately subsumed under the word “confederation” and its kindred terms. The two systems described by these different conceptions reflect, in part, the distinctions implied in the German Staatenbund (confederation) and Bundesstaat (federation), terms developed in the mid-nineteenth century (Mogi 1931). A certain degree of confusion remains because the terms invented to describe both systems were used indiscriminately for many years.

Though the American conception of federalism is today almost universally accepted as the most accurate usage, the confederal conception remains a living and legitimate aspect of the federal idea in its largest political sense. Today, the latter is most prominent among certain advocates of limited European union (the Common Market exemplifies a confederal form) and among many so-called world federalists.

Federalism and Related Systems

Federal systems are often confused with four other forms of political order that make use of specific federal principles. The use of some federal principles in multiple monarchies, legislative unions, empires, and decentralized unitary systems can have important consequences similar to those in authentically federal systems. But the fact that such principles do not permeate the four systems makes the distinctions between them and true federations extremely important. Federal systems differ from multiple (or dual) monarchies in two essential ways. The central constitutional characteristic of the multiple monarchy is that union exists only in the person of the sovereign and is maintained only through the exercise of executive power in the sovereign’s name. No significant common institutions exist to unite the constituent polities—no common legislatures, no common legal system, and little in the way of a common political substructure. On the contrary, each constituent polity maintains its own political system, which the monarch guarantees to support under the terms of his or her compact with the realm. Multiple monarchies have historically been less than democratic regimes. Even where there have been tendencies toward democratization, the very fact that union exists only by virtue of the common sovereign has tended to elevate the position of the monarch to one of real power. Attempts to transfer sovereignty or the attributes of sovereignty elsewhere, by their very nature, stimulate the division of this kind of association of civil societies into separate polities. Thus, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was held together by the Hapsburg emperors and disintegrated when that family ceased to rule (Sharma 1953, ch. 7). The dual monarchy of Sweden and Norway ceased to function when democratic government was introduced, transferring the attributes of sovereignty from the monarch to the nation(s). In Spain, on the other hand, the inability of the Spaniards to transform a multiple monarchy into a federal system, in a locale that by nature demanded peninsular union of some sort, led to the consolidation of the constituent polities into something approximating a unitary state that remained highly unstable because of the local barriers to consolidation that could be neither accommodated nor eradicated (Elliott 1964).

Multiple monarchies have been transformed into stable and unified polities through legislative union. The United Kingdom is a case in point. The centrifugal tendencies of the seventeenth-century dual monarchy linking England and Scotland were finally eliminated through a legislative union of the two nations in 1707. Legislative union bears very close resemblance to federal union at several crucial points. Though designed to direct public allegiance to a single national authority, the terms of the union encourage the political system to retain certain noncentralizing elements. The government of the nation remains national rather than central in character, since it is created by a perpetual covenant that guarantees the constituent parties their boundaries, representation in the national legislature, and certain local autonomies, such as their own systems of municipal law. Legislative unions usually unite unequal polities. The centralizing tendencies induced by this are somewhat counterbalanced by the residual desire for local self-government in the constituent states. Thus, in the United Kingdom the cabinet has acquired a supremacy not foreseen in 1707, but within the framework of cabinet government Scotland has acquired a national ministry of its own with a separate administrative structure, based in Scotland, for most of its governmental programs (Milne 1957).

Federal systems also differ from empires allowing cultural home rule. Such empires have often been termed “federal”—in some cases because they claim to be. The Roman Empire was the classic example of this kind of political system in the ancient world, and the Soviet Union may well have been its classic modern counterpart. In both cases, highly centralized political authorities possessing a virtual monopoly of power decide, for reasons of policy, to allow local populations with different ethnic or cultural backgrounds to maintain a degree of cultural home rule, provided that they remain politically subservient to the imperial regime. While this often appears to offer a substantial degree of local autonomy, its political effects are purposely kept minimal. Any local efforts to transform cultural home rule into political power are invariably met with suppressive force from the central government, even to the point of revoking cultural rights, as examples from the history of both empires reveal.

Federal systems are clearly different from decentralized unitary states, even though such states may allow local governments considerable autonomy in some ways. In such states, local powers are invariably restricted to local matters, as determined by the central authorities, and are subject to national supervision, restriction, and even withdrawal, though tradition may mitigate against precipitous action by the central government in areas where local privileges have been established. Still, as the English experience has shown, even powerful traditions supporting local autonomy have not stood in the way of great reconcentration of power by democratically elected parliaments when such action has been deemed necessary by a national majority.

Mature and Emergent Federal Systems

Several studies (Macmahon 1955; Wheare [1946] 1964) have attempted to draw distinctions between mature and emergent federal systems. The thrust of their argument is that federalism, when used to unify separate political systems to form a new nation, and federalism as a form of decentralized government in an established nation encourage markedly different kinds of political behavior. In the former case, federalism serves as a means to bring tenuous unity to nations composed of highly autonomous polities, with the locus of power remaining among the constituent units. As federal systems mature, so the argument goes, power is increasingly concentrated at the center, and federalism remains only to promote a certain amount of decentralization within an otherwise highly unified political system. Wheare goes so far as to argue that federalism is a transitional phenomenon useful in promoting progressively larger polities, which are then gradually discarded (in fact, if not in form) as an unnecessary encumbrance. This argument may have some validity in describing the history of nonfederal political systems that have utilized federal principles to promote national unity. For example, it can be used to describe the evolution of the United Kingdom into its present constitutional state. It cannot be applied, however, to any of the three exemplary federal systems—Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. Their national ties existed from the first, and their national governments were granted broad powers at the outset. Nor has federalism declined in importance as those nations have matured. There are undoubtedly differences between mature and emergent federal systems, but those differences are more likely to relate to the character of conflict and negotiation between the general and constituent governments than to their relative strengths.

Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations

Because the study of federalism at its most immediately empirical level heavily stresses the study of intergovernmental relations, the two are often considered to be synonymous. Federalism, however, is something much more than the relationships between governmental units, involving as it does principles that are designed to establish the proper character of those relationships and that must also affect the character of other political institutions within federal systems. As already indicated, federalism concerns the way in which federal principles influence party and electoral systems in federal polities just as much as it concerns the way in which local governments relate to their regional or national ones, or to each other. Moreover, the study of intergovernmental relations exists apart from the study of federalism, since such relationships are to be found in all political systems, federal or otherwise, where there is more than one government extant within a given polity.

CHARACTERISTICS AND OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES

The most useful way to attempt to understand federalism as a political phenomenon is to under—take a survey of the basic characteristics of federal systems, principles, and processes in order to understand both the manner and the direction of their development.

As a first step, it seems necessary to identify the various federal systems that exist today or have existed in the past; only then can we analyze them as operating political systems. However, identifying federal systems is no simple matter, as we have just seen. The difficulties are heightened by the wide functional differences easily observed in the various political systems that call themselves federal and by the often greater operational similarities between self-styled “federal” and “unitary” systems. Contrast, for example, the political systerns of Australia and the Soviet Union, Canada and Mexico, and Switzerland and Yugoslavia, or compare the United States and Great Britain.

Moreover, federal systems have historically been marked by great internal distinctions between theory and practice, perhaps more so than other political systems. In the United States, the measure of the maintenance of federalism was long considered to be the degree of separation of government activities by level, because it was generally believed that such separation actually existed. In fact, American federalism from the first had been characterized by extensive intergovernmental functional collaboration within the framework of separate governmental structures (Elazar 1962). Similarly, the Canadian federal system has always been described as one in which the federal government is clearly dominant—the repository of all powers not explicitly granted to the provinces. Yet since the brief period of federal supremacy in the years immediately following confederation, the provinces have consistently gained power at federal expense (Smiley 1965). The Russian federal constitution went so far as to grant each Soviet republic the right of secession—a patent impossibility under the realities of the Russian political system.

Nevertheless, some basic characteristics and operational principles common to all truly federal systems can be identified, and can help us to define such systems. These may be divided into three essential elements and a number of supplementary ones.

Written Constitution

First, the federal relationship must be established or confirmed through a perpetual covenant of union, inevitably embodied in a written constitution that outlines, among other things, the terms by which power is divided or shared in the political system and that can be altered only by extraordinary procedures. Every existing federal nation possesses a written constitution, as do most of the other nations incorporating elements of the federal principle. Juridically, federal constitutions are distinctive in that they are not simply compacts between the rulers and the ruled but involve the people, the general government, and the polities constituting the federal union. Moreover, the constituent polities retain local constitution-making rights of their own.

Noncentralization

The political system must reinforce the terms of the constitution through an actual diffusion of power among a number of substantially self-sustaining centers that are generally coincident with the constituent polities established by the federal compact. Such a diffusion of power may be termed “noncentralization.” It differs from decentralization— the conditional diffusion of specific powers to subordinate local governments by a central government, subject to recall by unilateral decision. It is also more than devolution— the special grant of powers to a subnational unit by a central government, not normally rescindable. Noncentralization ensures that no matter how certain powers may be shared by the general and constituent governments at any point in time, the authority to participate in exercising them cannot be taken away from either without mutual consent. Constituent polities in federal systems are able to participate as partners in national governmental activities and to act unilaterally with a high degree of autonomy in areas constitutionally open to them—even on crucial questions and, to a degree, in opposition to national policies, because they possess effectively irrevocable powers.

Areal Division of Power

A third element that appears to be essential in any federal system is the internal division of authority and power on an areal basis (Maass 1959), what in the United States has been called “territorial democracy.” It is theoretically possible to create a federal system whose constituent units are fixed but not territorially based. There were premodern protofederations of nomadic tribes, and some observers have seen federal elements in nations constitutionally structured to accommodate social and political divisions along ethnic, religious, or even ideological lines. Nevertheless, no authentic federal system has existed without an areal basis for the federal division. Historically, when areal divisions of power have given way to divisions on the basis of functional interest, federalism has been replaced by pluralism. In modern democratic theory the argument between Federalists and Anti-Federalists has frequently revolved around the respective values of areal and functional diffusions of power. Theorists who have argued the obsolescence of federalism while endorsing the values used to justify its existence have generally based their case on the superior utility of pluralism (Mogi 1931, 1059–115). Proponents of the federal-areal division argue that the deficiencies of territorial democracy are greatly overshadowed by the neutrality of areal representation of functional interests, and they argue further that any other system devised for giving power to these interests has proved unable to cope with the complexities and changes of interest endemic in a dynamic age while certainly limiting the advantages for local differentiation inherent in the areal system.

Studies of federal systems indicate the existence of other elements that supplement the three basic ones. While all of them are not always present in every federal system, their near universality leads one to the conclusion that they serve important functions in the maintenance of federalism in each. Similarly, while many of them are found individually in various kinds of political systems, it is their combination within a single system structured around the basic elements that is characteristic of federalism.

Maintaining Union

Generally characteristic of modern federal systems are direct lines of communication between the public and both the general and the constituent governments, which allow the public to exert direct influence on both governments and permit them to exercise direct authority over a common citizenry. The people may (and usually do) elect representatives to all governments that serve them. All of the governments may (and usually do) administer programs so as to serve the individual citizen directly. The courts may serve both levels of government, applying the relevant laws directly.

The existence of those direct lines of communication—one of the major features distinguishing federations from leagues—is usually predicated on the existence of a sense of common nationality binding the constituent polities and peoples of federal nations together, another element requisite for the maintenance of a successful federal system. In some countries this sense has been inherited, but in most it has had to be invented. Federalism in Germany has been based on a common sense of an inherited German nationhood. In the United States, Argentina, and Australia, a sense of nationhood had to be at least partly invented. National consciousness soon became second nature in those countries, since none of their constituent states ever had much more than a partially developed national consciousness of its own. Canada, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia have had to invent a sense of common nationality strong enough to embrace “nationality groups” whose intense national feelings are rooted in the constituent polities. In such newly formed federal systems as India, Malaysia, and Nigeria, the future of federalism is endangered by the absence of a common sense of nationality. Contrary to some theories, federalism has not proved to be a particularly good device for integrating diverse nationalities into a single political system unless it has been accompanied by other factors compelling integration.

Geographic necessity has been a major factor promoting the maintenance of union within federal systems, even in the face of strong pressures toward disunion. The Mississippi Valley in the United States, the Alps in Switzerland, the island character of the Australian continent, and the mountains and jungles surrounding Brazil have served as direct geographic influences promoting unity. More political than “natural,” but no less compelling geographically, have been the pressures for Canadian union generated by that country’s neighbor to the south or for the federation of the German states generated by their neighbors to the east and west.

Maintaining Noncentralization

It has been well demonstrated that the constituent polities in a federal system must be fairly equal in population and wealth, or at least balanced geographically or numerically in their inequalities, if noncentralization is to be maintained. The United States has been able to overcome its internal inequities because each geographic section has included both great and small states. In Canada, the ethnic differences between the two largest provinces have served to inject balance into the system. The existence of groups of cantons in different size categories has helped maintain Swiss federalism. Similar distributions exist in every other system whose federal character is not in question.

The existence of a large polity dominating smaller states with which it is nominally federated on equal terms has often been one of the major reasons for the failure of federalism. In the German federal empire of the late nineteenth century, Prussia was so obviously dominant that the other states had little opportunity to provide national leadership or even a reasonably strong hedge against the desires of its king and government. Similarly, even without the problem of the Communist Party, the existence of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, which occupied three-fourths of the area and contained three-fifths of the population of the Soviet Union, would have severely crippled the possibilities of maintaining authentic federal relationships in that country.

Successful federal systems have also been characterized by the permanence of the boundaries of their constituent units. This does not mean that boundary changes cannot occur, but it does mean that as a matter of constitutional law such changes can be made only with the consent of the polities involved and that, as a matter of political policy, they are avoided except in the most extreme situations. Boundary changes have occurred in the “classic” federal systems—the United States divided Virginia during the Civil War, Canada has enlarged the boundaries of its provinces, and Switzerland has divided cantons—but they have been the exception rather than the rule, and in every case at least the formal consent of the constituent polities was given. Even in weaker federal systems, such as those of Latin America, state boundaries have tended to remain relatively secure. When boundary changes have been made, as in the postwar redrawing of Lander boundaries in West Germany to account for the diminished territory of the Federal Republic and the alteration of state lines to recognize linguistic unities in India, the essential heartlands of the polities involved have been preserved.

In a few very important cases, noncentralization is both reflected and supported through the constitutionally guaranteed existence of different systems of law in the constituent polities. Though the differences in those systems are likely to be somewhat eroded over time—the extent of their preservation varying from system to system— their continued existence as separate systems and the national mixture of laws that their existence promotes act as great bulwarks against centralization. In the United States, each state’s legal system stems directly and to a certain extent uniquely from English law, while federal law occupies only an interstitial position binding the systems of the 50 states together insofar as necessary. The resulting mixture of laws keeps the administration of justice, even in federal courts, substantially noncentralized (Macmahon 1955, ch. 11). In Canada, the existence of common law and civil law systems side by side is one constitutional guarantee of French Canadian cultural survival. Noncentralized legal systems, a particularly Anglo-American device, are often used in legislative as well as federal unions. They are rare in other political cultures and have become less common in all federal systems established since 1900. More common is the provision for modification of national legal codes by the subnational governments to meet special local needs, as in Switzerland.

The point is generally well taken that unless the constituent polities have substantial influence over the formal or informal amending process, the federal character of the system is open to question. Since many constitutional changes are made without recourse to formal constitutional amendment, the position of the constituent polities must be additionally protected by a constitution designed so that any serious changes in the political order can be made only by the decision of dispersed majorities that reflect the areal division of powers. This protection, which federal theorists have argued is important for popular government as well as for federalism (Diamond 1963), is a feature of the most truly federal systems.

Noncentralization is strengthened in all federal systems by giving the constituent polities guaranteed representation in the national legislature and, often, by giving them a guaranteed role in the national political process. In some federal systems, notably those of the United States and Switzerland, the latter is guaranteed in the written constitution. In others, such as Canada and those in Latin America, certain powers of participation have been acquired and have become part of the traditional constitution.

Recent studies have shown that the existence of a noncentralized party system is perhaps the most important single element in the maintenance of federal noncentralization (Macmahon 1955). Noncentralized parties initially develop because of the constitutional arrangements of the federal compact, but once they have come into existence, they tend to be self-perpetuating and to function as decentralizing forces in their own right.

The United States and Canada provide two examples of the different forms that can be assumed by a noncentralized party system. In the United States, where party responsibility is minimal and virtually nonexistent on the national level, a two-party system has developed, with the parties actually being coalitions of the several state or, in some cases, local party organizations functioning as national units only for the quadrennial presidential elections or for purposes of organizing the national Congress. Party financing and decision making are functions that are dispersed either among the state organizations or among widely divergent factions operating nationwide. In Canada, on the other hand, the parliamentary form of government, with its concomitant requirement of party responsibility, means that at the national level considerably more party cohesiveness must be maintained simply in order to gain and hold power.

The noncentralized party system in Canada has developed through a fragmentation of the parties along regional or provincial lines. The parties with nationwide bases are still divided internally along provincial lines, with each provincial organization autonomous. Individual provinces are frequently dominated by regional parties that send only a few representatives to the national legislature, adding to the fragmentation of the system. Very often, the party victorious in national elections is the one that is briefly able to expand its base to most nearly national proportions.

European-style federal systems where parliamentary government is the norm follow the Canadian model. Australia and Switzerland come closest to paralleling it, and traces of it can be found in the German Federal Republic. A more centralized variation of the same pattern exists in countries like India, in which the national government is dominated by one very large and diffused national party that is held together nationally by personal leadership but is quite factionalized in the states where it must share the governing power with other parties.

Federal nations with less developed party systems frequently gain some of the same decentralizing effects through what Latin Americans call caudillismo—noncentralized personal leadership systems that diffuse power through strong local leaders operating in the constituent polities. Caudillistic noncentralization is most characteristic of Latin American federal systems but apparently exists in such new federations as Nigeria and Malaysia as well.

The importance to federalism of a noncentralized party system is well illustrated by contrast with those formally federal nations dominated by one highly centralized party, such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Mexico. In all three cases, the dominant party has operated to limit the power of the constituent polities in direct proportion to the extent of its dominance.

Ultimately, however, noncentralization is maintained to the extent that there is respect for the federal principle within each federal system. Such respect is necessarily reflected in the immediate recognition by the decision-making publics that the preservation of the constituent polities is as important as the preservation of the nation as a whole. In the words of the American Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, federalism looks to “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States” (Texas v. White 1869). This recognition may be based on loyalty to particular constituent polities or on an understanding of the role played by federalism in animating the political system along certain unique lines. Thus, those who value government by conciliation and partnership, with emphasis on local control, are likely to have respect for the federal principle.

Citizens of a federal nation must show that respect in two ways, by showing self-restraint and by cultivating the political art of negotiation. Federalism can exist only where there is considerable tolerance of diversity and willingness to take political action through conciliation even when the power to act unilaterally is available. The usual prerequisite to action in federal systems is the ability to build consensus rather than the power to threaten coercion. Western federal nations can furnish many examples of the exercise of national self-restraint in dealing with difficult federal problems. Even in a federal system as centralized as that of India, the constitutional right of the national government to assume control of the state governments is exercised as little as possible—notably when the Communists win local elections—and is then clearly a temporary action.

The historical record indicates that the dual purpose implied in Chase’s dictum has been at least as responsible for the creation of federal systems as has the single interest in political unification. The Canadian confederation came into being not only to create a new nation out of the British North American colonies but also to give Ontario and Quebec autonomous political systems of their own. Similarly, every move toward greater union in the Swiss confederation has been made in order to preserve the independence of the cantons from both outside encroachment and revolutionary centralism (Sharma 1953, 269–75). A good case can be made that similar motivations were important in the creation of Australia, Malaysia, Nigeria, and the United States.

Maintaining the Federal Principle

Several of the devices commonly found in federal systems serve to maintain the federal principle per se and are consequently supportive of both the national government and the constituent polities. Two of these are particularly common and important.

The maintenance of federalism requires that the nation and its constituent polities each have a substantially complete set of governing institutions of their own with the right—within limits set by the compact—to modify those institutions unilaterally. Separate legislative and administrative institutions are both necessary. This does not necessarily mean that all governmental activities must be carried out by separate institutions at each level. It is possible for the agencies of one government to serve as agents of the other by mutual agreement. But each government must have the needed institutions to function independently in the areas of its authority and the structural resources to cooperate freely with the other government’s counterpart agencies.

In this regard, the contractual sharing of public responsibilities by all governments in the system appears to be a central characteristic of federalism. Sharing, broadly conceived, includes common involvement in policy making, financing, and administration of government activities. In contemporary federal systems, it is characterized by extensive intergovernmental collaboration. Sharing can be based on highly formal arrangements or informal agreements. In federal systems, it is usually contractual in nature. The contract—politically a limited expression of the compact principle—is used in formal arrangements as a legal device to enable governments responsible to separate polities to engage in joint action while remaining independent entities. Even where government agencies cooperate without formally contracting to do so, the spirit of federalism that pervades ongoing federal systems tends to infuse the participating parties with a sense of contractual obligation.

In any federal system, it is likely that there will be continued tension between the federal government and the constituent polities over the years and that different “balances” between them will develop at different times. The existence of this tension is an integral part of the federal relationship, and its character does much to determine the future of federalism in each system. The question of federal-state relations that it produces is perennially a matter of public concern because virtually all other political issues arising in a federal system are phrased in terms of their implications for federalism. In this way, federalism imposes a way of looking at problems that stands apart from the substantive issues raised by the problems themselves. This is particularly true of those issues that affect the very fabric of society. In the United States, for example, the race question is a problem of federal-state as well as black-white relations, and the same is true of the cultural question in Canada and the linguistic question in India.

The End Product

The very terminology of federalism is characterized by a revealing ambiguity that is indicative of the end product of federal systems. The word “federalize” is used to describe the unification of “sovereign” states into a federal polity and also the permanent devolution of authority and power within a nation to subnational governments. In this ambiguity lies the essence of the federal principle—the perpetuation of both union and noncentralization.

Viewed from the top, the combination of the elements discussed above results in a federal rather than a central government, that is, a government composed of a nationwide coalition of political institutions, some with predominantly local power bases (such as the national legislature), and others with predominantly national power bases (such as the national bureaucracy). This government, whose power is thus diffused vertically and laterally, functions in cooperation with the constituent polities that it must conciliate in order to act. Decision making is characterized by heavy reliance upon negotiation and bargaining and by minimal reliance upon the exercise of force. Operations are characterized by a measure of disorder, since noncentralization breeds multiple power centers located at or cutting across all levels of government. Each of these centers seeks to keep open routes of access to the others, usually succeeding because it is in the best interests of all to maintain this kind of disorder as part of the “rules of the game.”

Viewed locally, a federal system consists of governmental inputs from different sources whose local connections normally serve to fragment local authority. However, because such a system rewards those who actively seek to reconcile the diffuse elements and bind them together for a larger purpose, local political leaders can control these inputs to a great extent. While this may not prevent the national government from exercising great power at any given time or from increasing its total power over time, it does mean that as long as the federal principle remains operative, the public can and almost invariably does limit certain kinds of national government actions or guides such actions into particular channels (often directed toward strengthening the constituent governments) by invoking the terms of the compact.

Viewed theoretically, these patterns of behavior and the arguments advanced to justify them serve to reaffirm the fundamental principles that (1) the strength of a federal polity does not stem from the power of the national government but from the authority vested in the nation as a whole, (2) both the national government and the governments of the constituent polities are possessed of delegated powers only, and (3) all governments are limited by the common national constitution.

All this should make it apparent that federalism is a form of popular government embodying elements of both republicanism and democracy. The federal structures occasionally adopted by nondemocratic systems must generally be considered “window dressing” except insofar as the injection of the federal principle may serve as a democratizing force in itself. In Yugoslavia, for example, the existence of a federal superstructure has proved useful in fostering such decentralization as the Communist Party leadership wished to allow and may even have played a role in stimulating decentralizing tendencies.

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT

Ancient Protofederal Systems

Long before the term “federal” was invented, there were political systems that embodied elements of the federal principle. The Israelite political system was probably the first example in recorded history of a union of constituent polities based on a sense of common nationality, with national and tribal political institutions and some division of functions between the two partly formalized by a written constitution. As a republic it was never able to overcome the problems of national executive leadership and succession and, after some 200 years, revised its constitution to superimpose a limited monarchy on its federal institutions. Still, as many of the seventeenth-century Federalists noted, it came closer to resembling a modern federal system than any comparable premodern nation. Its classic intellectual product, the Bible, was the first book to discuss the problems of a federal polity.

Permanent leagues of independent states united by a sense of common need but without any sense of common nationhood were found in various parts of the Greek world. They were entrusted with certain matters in the realm of foreign affairs and defense but were in every respect accountable to their member states. The classic example of this system was the Achaean League (251–146 B.C.), a protofederal system often erroneously considered to be the first federal polity (Freeman [1863] 1893). The Greeks left some descriptions of their leagues but no theoretical discussions of the league as a political system. Except for Aristotle’s criticisms, the great Greek political theorists ignored federalism as a political principle because the very idea contradicted their conception of the small, unified polis as the only basis upon which to build the good regime.

Several of the great ancient empires, notably the Persian, Hellenic, and Roman Empires, structured their political systems around the principle of cultural home rule. Since political life was virtually inseparable from the religious and cultural aspects of society in the ancient world, imperial recognition of local constitutions offered a measure of contractual devolution of political power; however, as in more recent examples of this form of imperialism, such home rule was not a matter of local right but represented a conditional grant subject to unilateral revocation by the imperial rulers.

Medieval Experiments

Elements of the federal principle are foreshadowed in medieval feudalism through its emphasis on essentially immutable contractual relationships that permanently link the contracting parties while guaranteeing their rights. However, the hierarchical character of these relationships, coupled with the lack of practical mechanisms to maintain the terms of the contracts, led to the degeneration of those elements in most feudal societies. Another movement in the direction of federalism grew out of the development of medieval commercial towns in central Europe that formed leagues for mutual defense and assistance following the Greek model. The most important development in this period was the first confederation of Swiss cantons in 1291 for mutual aid in defense of their independence. The success of this effort was in no small measure due to its connection, from the beginning, with quasi-popular government. These embryonic federal experiments all proceeded pragmatically while federal theory was confined to juridical discussions of the corporate relationships between polities in the Holy Roman Empire.

Ultimately a fusion of contractual elements from feudalism with political mechanisms from the commercial confederacies gave rise to the immediate antecedents of modern federalism. The Christian states on the Iberian Peninsula created a political system that in its most advanced stages came very close to authentic federalism. During the years of the Spanish Reconquest, most of the peninsula was reorganized under the fuero system, which established local governments with relatively liberal political institutions in order to encourage resettlement. New states were formed through feudal-style contractual relationships designed to protect local rights. Three of these states joined in a quasi-federal arrangement under the Crown of Aragon, each of them (plus several in Italy added later) retaining its own constitution and governing institutions as well as acquiring representation in the overall Aragonese government. The unification of Spain under a multiple monarchy in 1469 left most of these federal elements intact for the next two and a half centuries, but the demands of the monarchy ultimately subverted them, transforming Spain into a precariously centralized state.

In the sixteenth century, certain emergent civil societies, influenced by the Reformation to return to Scripture as a political source, by the Spanish system of political organization, as well as by local necessity, began to apply federal principles for statebuilding purposes. The Hapsburg heirs to the Spanish crown had applied Iberian principles to the organization of their other European possessions. Their governmental reforms in the Netherlands provided an organizational basis for the federation of the United Provinces in the late sixteenth century. When that country gained its independence, it established a political system that, while unable to solve the most crucial technical problems of federalism, maintained itself in federal style for 200 years, until Napoleon put an end to its existence, leaving a residue of noncentralization that marks the Netherlands today.

The Swiss, in the meantime, were developing their own techniques for combining feudal and commercial elements to create a loose confederation of cantons, which was also influenced by biblical ideas and, perhaps negatively, by contacts with Hapsburg Spain. Achieving full independence in 1648, the Swiss confederation remained loosely leagued for two centuries (except for the Napoleonic interlude), until it adopted a federal constitution in 1848.

First Modern Formulations

The protofederalism of the United Provinces and the Swiss cantons, coming at the outset of the age of nationalism, also stimulated the first serious efforts to formulate federal theories based on modern political ideas. Jean Bodin analyzed the possibilities of federation in light of the problem of sovereignty. Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf examined federal arrangements as aspects of international law. These theorists all treated federalism as an aspect of international law. Johannes Althusius (1603), analyzing the Dutch and Swiss constitutions, was the first to perceive that federalism was really concerned with problems of national unity. The real father of modern federal theory, he was also the first to connect federalism with popular sovereignty and to distinguish between leagues, multiple monarchies, and confederations. His retention of hierarchical principles and his emphasis on the corporate organization of society both flawed the federal character of his work and reflected the empirical roots of his analysis.

Thus the rise of the nation-state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries stimulated federal solutions to the problems of national unification. In all but a few countries on the periphery of western Europe, the application of federal principles foundered on three problems: (1) the conciliation of feudally rooted hierarchies with a system demanding fundamental social equality in order to facilitate the sharing of power, (2) the reconciliation of local autonomy with national energy in an era of political upheaval that required most nations to maintain a state of constant mobilization basically incompatible with the toleration of local differences, and (3) the problem of executive leadership and succession, which is particularly complex in federal systems and was not solved until the United States invented the elected presidency.

Modern Federalism

The rise of modern imperialism also contributed to the emergence of federalism, as indicated by the works of the important prerevolutionary political theorists of the eighteenth century, for example, Montesquieu and Adam Smith. Here, too, the Spanish experience was influential, but it remained for the British to create the requisite popular institutions in their colonization of North America and for the biblically influenced colonists to create the theoretical justification for these institutions. The theoretical ambiguity of those quasi-federal institutions led Americans to assume that their relationship to the British government was federal, while London entertained no such notion (Becker [1922] 1958). The Americans’ response to their view of the imperial system helped them develop the federal ideas they were later to use so creatively.

The founders of the United States of America can be said to have transformed and organized the principles of federalism into a practical system of government. They were able to do so partly because their nation developed without the disadvantages that plagued earlier federal systems. As a postfeudal society, the United States had no serious problem of coping with hierarchies. As a relatively isolated nation, external pressures for centralization were not present for nearly 150 years. American political inventiveness took care of the internal problems of applying the federal principle, though not without having to fight a major civil war to resolve some of them. Though the specific forms of American federalism were not widely imitated with success, its basic principles of organization were emulated by almost every other nation attempting the federal solution to the problems of popular government in a pluralistic civil society. The creation of the theoretical framework for those principles was part and parcel of the invention of federalism. Set forth in its basics in the debate over ratification of the U.S. Constitution, that framework had at its core The Federalist (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay [1787–88] 1961), the classic formulation of the principles of modern federalism. Equally important to the evolution of federal systems, however, were the arguments of those who wished to preserve even greater state autonomy; many of these arguments were transformed into tools to promote extraconstitutional decentralization during the nineteenth century.

From the first, American contributions to federal theory—even those of the few theorists not actively involved in politics—have been rooted in the practical concerns of maintaining a federal system. Most of these contributions have, accordingly, been formulated as discussions of constitutional law. The courts, particularly the federal Supreme Court, have conducted continuing debate on the meaning and character of federalism through the medium of case law. Leading political figures, such as Albert Gallatin, John Calhoun, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Theodore and Franklin D. Roosevelt, have made real contributions through their state papers. The pragmatic orientation of those contributions, however, has tended to obscure their more lasting theoretical importance (Anderson 1955).

The French Revolution, while stimulating the development of popular government, was essentially hostile to the spirit and institutions of federalism. Its immediate heirs tried to destroy federal institutions in western Europe in the name of democracy, and the subsequent bearers of its tradition have proved equally hostile to federal ideas—except insofar as some of them have equated federalism with decentralized government.

In the nineteenth century, several of the new Latin American nations, following the United States’ example and also influenced by the federal elements in the Hispanic imperial tradition, experimented with federalism, with distinctly mixed results. Even where federalism survived in theory, the instability of Latin American governments and the frequent recourse to dictatorial regimes hampered its effective operation. Even so, the three largest Latin American nations—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—retain federal systems of varying political significance; federal principles are also included in the political systems of Colombia and Venezuela.

In the mid-nineteenth century, European politicians and political theorists, stimulated by necessity, the American example, and the very influential studies of Tocqueville ([1835] 1945), turned to consider federalism as a form of democratic political organization. Though practical applications remained few, numerous works were produced, primarily in the German-speaking countries, where doctrinaire and metaphysical analyses of federalism in relation to the problems of nationalism, sovereignty, and popular consent were in vogue. The most important of these works were the theoretical formulations of Bluntschli (1849–52), based on his observations of federal reorganization in Switzerland, and the historical studies of Gierke ([1913] 1934). In the end, federal principles were used in the unification of Germany, and Switzerland adopted a modern federal constitution. Fully federal solutions were rejected in other nations, but several adopted quasi-federal institutions to meet particular problems of unification and decentralization.

During the late nineteenth century, British interest in imperial federalism was manifested in several ways. Canada and Australia were given federal constitutions and dominion status in 1867 and 1901, respectively, and the foundations were laid for the federal unification of India. British political theorists interested in imperial unity and internal devolution explored contemporary (Bryce [1888] 1909) and historical (Freeman [1863] 1893) federal experiments and presented arguments of their own as to the utility and proper organization of federal systems (Labilliere 1894).

Whereas in the nineteenth century federalism was used to abet ethnic nationalism, in the twentieth it has been used as a means to unify multiethnic nations. Several of the ethnically heterogeneous nations created or reconstructed after World War I, including the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, formally embraced federalism as a nominal solution to their nationality problems. The United Kingdom added a federal dimension at the same time to accommodate the Irish. The extension of nation-building activities to Asia and Africa, where ethnic diversity is even greater than in Europe, has led to new efforts in the same vein. In nations outside of the totalitarian orbit, such as India and Malaysia, federalism has been used to secure political and cultural rights for the larger ethnolinguistic groups. In Africa, where the survival of separate ethnic groups has been called into question by the native nationalists, federalism has been applied in several nations, including Nigeria and Cameroon, as a device for sharing political power rather than a way to maintain cultural autonomy.

The Contemporary Study of Federalism

The emergence of political science as a discipline in the late nineteenth century stimulated a shift from an explicitly normative to a predominantly empirical interest in federalism. Such noted British scholars as Bryce (1901) and Dicey ([1885] 1961) were the first to study federalism as part of their general interest in political systems. American scholars began their work in the 1870s, as the Civil War generation was passing into history, but their first works still reflected the issues of the war. Thus Burgess (1886) concluded that the utility of the states was dissipated by modern technology just as their power was destroyed by the war, while Wilson ([1885] 1961) accepted the view that the war had wrought great changes but still saw federalism as alive and vital.

Though these men and their colleagues laid the foundations for the empirical study of federal systems with the tools of contemporary political science, federalism as a field of study was neglected for many years. The rise of other problems to attract the attention of scholars, the negation of earlier legalistic and metaphysical approaches, and the decline of normative interest in the federal principle combined to dissuade younger political scientists from examining questions of federal government, except incidentally, until the twentieth century was well advanced.

Renewed interest in the field first developed when American students of public administration found themselves confronted with problems of intergovernmental relations at nearly every turn. The study of intergovernmental relations in the administrative realm brought about significant gains in the understanding of the process of federal government, not the least of which was a growing recognition that the assumptions about federalism underlying their work, borrowed whole from nineteenth-century theorists, needed serious reexamination. Beginning in the 1930's and 1940's, American and British political scientists began to raise fundamental questions about the nature of federal systems and the interrelationships of their governmental components (Anderson 1946). In the 1950's these questions were expanded to include, among others, problems of political influence, the role of political parties, the historical development of federal systems, and the meaning of earlier federal theories (Bachelder and Shaw 1964). By the early 1960's, students of existing federal governments were rediscovering the need to clarify the principles of federalism in order to understand the operation of those governments. Students of comparative government were also becoming increasingly interested in problems of political integration, centralization, and decentralization—all of which stimulated new interest in the systematic study of federalism.

EVALUATION

While many attempts to establish federal systems have ended in failure, such systems, once established, have proved to be most durable. No authentic federal system that has lasted for even fifteen years has ever been abandoned except through revolutionary disruption (as in the case of Germany), and in every such case federalism—showing remarkable resilience—has ultimately been restored. Certain theories to the contrary, there is no evidence that federalism represents a transitional stage on the road to unitary government. No federal system in history has ever “evolved” into a unitary one, nor has any established system been structurally consolidated by internal decision. On the contrary, federal devices to conciliate minority populations have been used in place of force to maintain unity even in consolidated systems. Moreover, federal systems or systems strongly influenced by the federal principle have been among the most stable and long lasting of polities.

At the same time, relatively few cultures have been able to utilize federal principles in government. Anglo-American civil societies have done so most successfully. Even those not fully committed to federalism have, without exception, included elements of the federal principle in whatever systems they have chosen, no doubt because both constitutionalism and noncentralization rate high on the scale of Anglo-American political values.

Of the sixteen formally federal nations that exist in the world today, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, and the United States were created under British colonial tutelage. These seven include all the nations established since World War II that have been able to maintain federal systems, and they provide most of the successful examples of federalism in operation. Of the nine remaining federal nations, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico fall directly within the Hispanic political tradition, and Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, though they follow the Germanic political tradition, were also influenced by Hispanic ideas at some point in their development. Both political traditions have been influential in stimulating federal inclinations in many of the nonfederal nations, but they have been notably less successful in fostering lasting federal institutions; the Hispanic tradition has failed to combine federalism and stability, while the Germanic has tended toward authoritarian centralization. (The three remaining nations, Libya, the former Soviet Union, and former Yugoslavia, are federal in name and formal structure but hardly in any meaningful sense of the term.)

The successful operation of federal systems requires a particular kind of political environment, one that is conducive to popular government and has the strong traditions of political cooperation and self-restraint that are needed to maintain a system that minimizes the use of coercion. Beyond the level of tradition, federal systems operate best in societies with sufficient homogeneity of fundamental interests—or consensus—to allow a great deal of latitude in political operations and to place primary reliance upon voluntary collaboration. The existence of severe strains on the body politic that lead to the use of force to maintain domestic order is even more inimical to the successful maintenance of federal patterns of government than of other forms of popular government. Moreover, federal systems are most successful in civil societies with the human resources to fill many public offices competently and with material resources plentiful enough to allow a measure of economic waste in payment for the luxury of liberty.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

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This essay is reprinted from David L. Sills (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1972). Reprinted by permission of the Gale Group.

Daniel J. Elazar

Last updated: 2006

SEE ALSO: Federal-State Relations; Intergovernmental Relations; U.S. Constitution